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This study examines the factors affecting choice of pricing and payment practices 
by traditional marketing and new generation co-operatives for commodities delivered by 
their members. These factors include the demographic variables related to type of co-
operative organization, level of competition in commodity market, and risk-return 
perceptions of members and co-operatives.  
Data for the analysis were obtained through a mail survey. Questionnaires were send 
to one hundred and ninety five (195) co-operatives in mid-west states of the U.S.A. and 
Canada. Altogether 93 co-operatives responded to the survey. Mean score analysis, factor 
analysis and multinomial logit analysis were done.  
  The results indicate that traditional marketing co-operatives are more likely to 
choose spot market cash price, while new generation co-operatives are more likely to 
choose pooling practices. Traditional marketing co-operatives appear to be concerned 
about the members’ cash flow needs and members’ uncertainty of return; they are also 
more responsive to increased competitive level in commodity market. New generation 
co-operatives are more concerned with avoiding the risk of co-operatives’ operating 
deficits and survival of co-operatives.  This has implications for new co-operatives just 
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New Generation Co-operatives (NGC) as a Model for Value-Added Agricultural 
Processing in Alberta:   Applications to Factors Affecting Choice of Pricing and 
Payment Practices by Traditional Marketing and New Generation Co-operatives. 
 
1.0  Objectives: 
 
The overall objective of this study is to investigate the differences in choice of 
pricing and payment practices of different co-operative organizations for the commodities 
delivered by members. 
 
The specific objectives of this study are as follows: 
 
i)  To analyze the factors affecting pricing and payment practices in traditional 
marketing and new generation co-operatives. 
ii)  To investigate the differences in pricing and payment practices between new 
generation co-operatives and traditional marketing co-operatives. 
iii)  To analyze the relationships between degree of competition in commodity and 
output market with co-operative’s choice of particular pricing and payment 
practices. 
 
The results from this study can be used by new generation co-operatives to help guide 
their purchasing strategies when they start up their business. 
 
2.0  Background: 
 
Agricultural marketing co-operatives are developed by farmers as a self-help business 
firm model to move product to market and influence price and other terms of trade while 
providing fair treatment and other benefits to members. These traditional marketing co-
operatives are owned and controlled by member producers for their own benefits. 
Various reasons have been cited for formation of marketing co-operatives. Needs for 
institutional mechanisms to counter the economic ramifications of excess supply-induced 
prices and to countervail opportunism and hold out situations due to market failure have 
been cited as the main reasons for formation of agriculture co-operatives. Organizational 
structure may differ from co-operatives to co-operatives and from country to country. 
However, the most common features of traditional co-operatives are: 
 
-  The stockholders, who are farmers, are the major users of the co-operative’s services. 
-  Members receive benefits from level of patronage rather than the level of equity 
capital contribution. 
-  The formal governance of the business by the stockholders is structured 
“democratically” based on one member one-vote systems. 
-  Co-operatives have open membership policy. 
 
At the global and national level, agri-industry is being transformed into capital-
intensive, value-added and more market-driven businesses. At the same time, farm   ii  
production has become more specialized, financing requirements for production have 
increases, and direct government support has been reduced in Canada. Although 
traditional marketing co-operatives are believed to ameliorate the negative economic 
impact of market failure, they are facing the “internal incentive problems”, which 
discourages members from investing in their co-operatives. These “internal incentive 
problems” emanate from “user-versus-investor” set of vaguely defined property right 
structure and open member policy of traditional co-operatives. Cook (1995) asserted that 
the inability to generate sufficient equity capital from members severely constrained the 
co-operatives’ ability to engage in capital-intensive and value-added ventures. 
During the early 1990’s, with the concerted efforts of a number of key players 
committed to the growth and development of rural economies, the new wave of producer 
owned co-operatives emerged in the northern mid-west of the U.S.A. These new co-
operatives are named “New Generation C-operatives” (NGCs). NGCs are different from 
traditional co-operatives in three aspects. These are i) Closed membership, ii) Tradable 
membership shares iii) Engaged in value-added processing ventures. 
 
i)  Closed membership: 
 
NGCs are market driven. Market demand for the processed product determines 
the appropriate scale of the business and this in turn limits the size of membership. 
 
ii)  Tradable membership rights: 
 
In order to patronize NGCs, one must purchase delivery rights or membership shares. 
Each unit of membership share allows producers to deliver a specified volume and 
quality of farm produce to co-operatives. These tradable membership shares not only 
allocate rights to deliver units of the commodity, but also distribute up-front 
capitalization responsibilities equitably among members according to level of patronage. 
Therefore, this membership right tied the level of equity investment with the level of 
patronage. 
 
iii)  Engaged in value added processing ventures: 
 
In contrast to traditional marketing co-operatives, researchers claim NGCs are 
involved in value added processing ventures in a greater extent. A common reason for the 
formation of NGCs is the desire to develop new-value added products and to capture the 
greater portion of consumer expenditure. 
Although these NGCs were able to solve the internal incentive problem associated 
with vaguely defined property right structure in traditional co-operatives, maintaining the 
member commitment is vital for survival of NGCs as well as traditional marketing co-
operatives. Pricing of commodities and methods of payment for a commodity delivered 
by members is one important aspect of a co-operative’s business related to member’s 
satisfaction and commitment. Because pricing and payment practices dictate the timing 
and distribution of benefits, these affect the welfare of members and their commitment to 
co-operatives.   iii  
There are different pricing and payment options available for co-operatives. These 
alternatives include spot market cash price, pooled price, fixed forward price contract, 
guaranteed minimum price, basis contract and hedge-to-arrive contract. These practices 
may have differential impact on distribution of benefit and risk between co-operatives 
and their members. A proper balance of benefit and risk between the co-operatives and 
members is crucial for maintaining members’ commitment without jeopardizing the co-
operatives’ economic goals. 
In a typical agricultural market, co-operatives are not the sole business firm. 
There exist other co-operatives and investor owned firms (IOFs) that compete with a co-
operative’s businesses. The presence of other firms, either co-operatives or profit-
oriented firms who use the same commodity as do co-operative, increases the 
competition to buy producers’ raw commodity. With increased competition to buy a 
producer’s commodity, members may contract to those firms who offer better alternatives 
in terms of risk, return and other services. In order to maintain the commitment of 
members and prevent them from leaving co-operatives, co-operatives have to take into 
consideration the pricing and payment practices of their competitors while choosing their 
own pricing and payment practices. Therefore, with increased competition in the 
commodity market, balancing the risk and return between member producers and co-
operative is more crucial. 
Type of organization and operation of co-operative may affect the choice of 
pricing and payment practices. Similarly, level of competition in commodity market may 
affect the choice of pricing and payment practices by co-operatives. Very little 
information is available about factors affecting choice of different pricing and payment 
contract by co-operatives. It is essential to recognize the important factors, which are 
responsible for choosing a particular pricing and payment contract by co-operatives. 
Better understanding of important factors will enable the policy maker to better analyze 
the conditions under which co-operatives choose a particular pricing and payment 
practices. 
 
3.0  Methodology: 
 
The written survey was designed to elicit information on each co-operative’s 
choice of particular pricing and payment practices. NGCs and traditional marketing co-
operatives differ in several demographic variables, so questions were asked to elicit 
information on these differential characteristics of co-operatives. These differential 
characteristics include: membership policy, commodity delivery contract, provision of 
transferable equity shares, proportions of commodity processed and year of business 
operations. From a literature review of pricing and payment practices for commodity 
delivered by members in co-operatives as well as by private commodity handlers, six 
pricing and payment alternatives have been identified. These are spot market cash price, 
pooled price, fixed forward price contract, guaranteed minimum price contract, basis 
contract and hedge-to-arrive contract. Respondents were asked to rank these alternatives 
according to the most commonly used alternatives in their co-operatives.  
Close-ended questions were included in the survey questionnaire to elicit 
information on co-operative’s perceptions about the importance of various factors which 
play a role in a co-operative’s decision to choose a particular pricing and payment   iv  
practices. Responses on these factors were measured on a 1-5 likert scale, where “1” 
indicates the factor under consideration is “not important at all” and “5” indicates “very 
important” for co-operatives. 
A mail survey method was chosen over other survey alternatives.  Names and 
addresses of three hundred traditional marketing as well as new generation co-operatives 
were collected from various sources. Co-operatives from Mid-West region of the United 
States were selected, because these regions have experienced the formation of new 
generation co-operatives. For Canada, co-operatives from the Prairie Provinces, Ontario 
and British Columbia were selected. Co-operatives were contacted by telephone in order 
to verify their mailing address and request their consent for survey. Altogether one 
hundred and ninety five (195) co-operatives agreed to participate in the survey. In the 
third week of January 2000, questionnaires were mailed to those co-operatives that 
agreed.  A follow up telephone call was made in the last week of February to those co-
operatives that had not returned the survey questionnaire. By the end of March 2000, 
ninety-three of the co-operatives had responded to the questionnaire. 
Four statistical and analytical methods were employed to analyze the data.  These 
were mean score comparison, factor analyses, multinomial logit analysis and rank-logit 
analysis. 
 
3.1  Mean score comparisons: 
 
There are many applications for which it is desirable to compare the means of two 
different populations. In order to identify the differences in perceptions of various types 
of co-operatives on the importance of factors in choosing the particular pricing and 
payment practices, the mean scores given to different variables were compared. 
 
3.2  Factor Analysis: 
 
Factor analysis is a method of transforming the original variables into new, non-
correlated variables, called factors. The essential purpose of factor analysis is to describe 
the variation among many variables in terms of a few underlying but unobservable 
random variables called factors.  
Common factor analysis is done on response on the co-operative’s perceptions 
about importance of various factors (measured in 1-5 scale) in choosing particular pricing 
and payment practices. The responses are related to various factors; viz.; commodity and 
output market environment, financial management of co-operatives, members' welfare, 
co-operatives' goal and philosophy. 
 
3.3  Multinomial logit analysis: 
 
A multinomial logit model was employed to estimate the probability of ranking 
the member pricing alternative as number “1” or the probability of choosing the 
alternative as the most preferred one. Four pricing and payment practices, viz. Spot 
market cash price, pooled price, fixed forward price contract and others were considered 
as dependent variables for estimation of multinomial logit model. As such, the probability   v  
of choosing a particular pricing and payment alternative as the most common practice by 
co-operatives can be estimated by the multinomial logit model (Greene 1993, p. 666): 
 
3.4  Rank Logit Model: 
 
Ranked responses on seven pricing and payment alternatives were elicited. Responses on 
rank cannot be modeled with an ordinary least square (OLS) regression model because of 
the non-interval nature of dependent variables. Including all ranked responses in a 
multinomial logit model fails to account for the ordinal nature of dependent variables. 
Respondents were asked to rank the given alternatives, so dependent variables are not 
inherently ordered. Therefore we can not use an ordered probit and logit model. A 
ranking model was also used.  
 
4.0  Results and Discussions: 
 
4.1 Analysis of frequency of responses: 
 
From the frequency analysis of responses on various survey questions, the 
development of New Generation Co-operatives (NGCs) is a recent phenomenon. Co-
operatives possessing NGC characteristics are smaller in member size and are engaged in 
processing activities to a greater extent than co-operatives possessing characteristics of 
traditional co-operatives. Debt is the major source of capital for all co-operatives, 
however co-operatives with the characteristics of NGCs are more often relying on 
required equity purchase and entry fees than are co-operatives with the characteristics of 
traditional co-operatives. Co-operatives with the characteristics of NGCs are doing 
businesses in potentially less competitive market environments than co-operatives with 
the characteristics of traditional co-operatives. A greater proportion of co-operative with 
NGC characteristics are selling their output through some kind of contractual 
arrangements, such as price or volume contract or both. Pooling is the most common 
pricing and payment practice of co-operatives with the characteristics of NGCs, where as 
spot market cash price is the most common practice of co-operatives with the 
characteristics of traditional co-operatives. 
 
4.2  Mean score analysis: 
 
NGCs differ from traditional co-operatives in membership structure, commodity 
delivery contract and tradable equity stocks. From the survey of co-ops, these features are 
not exclusively confined to NGCs and the number of NGCs consisting of all three of the 
commonly cited NGC characteristics is very few.  
Comparison of mean scores for each variable is done on co-operatives of Canada vs. 
USA; co-operatives with open vs. closed membership, fixed quantity vs. unlimited 
quantity commodity delivery contracts, and transferable vs. nontransferable equity stocks. 
None of the variables under consideration are significantly different between co-
operatives of Canada and the U.S.A.  Co-operatives with the characteristics of traditional 
marketing co-operatives place greater importance on matching the competitors’ pricing 
and payment policy, meeting competition in output markets and encouraging members to   vi  
deliver to their co-operatives. Whereas co-operatives with the characteristics of NGCs 
give more importance to reducing the risk of operating deficits, member’s uncertainty of 
return and treating all members equally. 
 
4.3  Factor analysis: 
 
Common factor analysis was done on responses elicited on various variables, which 
are considered important for co-operatives decision to choose a particular pricing and 
payment practices. These responses are elicited in a 1-5 rating scale.  
Using the eigen-value criteria, four factors are retained. Factor “1” has the highest 
loading with the variables: co-operative’s need to reduce the member’s uncertainty of 
returns, maintaining target rate of return and risk of avoiding co-operative’s operating 
deficit. Thus factor “1” can be considered as a risk-return factor for members and co-
operatives. Factor “2” has the highest loading with the variables: matching the rival’s 
pricing and payment practices, and presence of competitors in co-operative’s output 
market. Thus, factor 2 can be considered as market environment factor. Co-operative’s 
need to address cash flow needs of member producers and encouraging members to 
deliver into co-operatives have higher loading with factor “3”. Similarly, managing 
working capital and equal treatment of members have higher loading on factor “4”. 
Factor “4” can be considered as the working capital management factor. 
 
4.4  Multinomial logit analysis: 
 
Four multinomial logit models were estimated using LIMDEP, Version 7.0. In the 
first two models, only the pricing and payment alternatives ranked as number “1” are 
included as dependent variable. Whereas in the third and fourth model, full rank 
responses on pricing and payment alternative is included as dependent variables. 
In the first and third model, only the demographic variables are included as 
explanatory variables. Along with demographic variables, factor scores extracted from 
factor analysis were also included as explanatory variables in model 2 and 4. 
Based on the coefficient estimates, we cannot directly predict the direction of impact 
of different explanatory variables in co-operative’s choice of pricing and payment 
alternatives. The coefficients from all four models show that distinguishing 
characteristics of NGCs and traditional marketing co-operatives such as, membership 
policy, commodity delivery contract, transferable delivery rights and level of processing 
activities have significant impacts on choice of pricing and payment policies. Similarly, 
the number of competitor firms in commodity market has significant impact on choice of 
pricing and payment practice. 
 
4.5  Probability analysis: 
 
The estimated coefficients from multinomial logit and rank logit model only 
represents the relative movement between a pair of choice outcomes. The sign and 
magnitude of coefficients estimated from the MNL model are not straightforward to 
interpret. Predicted probabilities and marginal probabilities can predict the impact of   vii  
change in explanatory variables on co-operatives’ choice of pricing and payment 
practices.  
 
Marginal probabilities were estimated in two scenarios. The first scenario is when the 
profile of a “representative traditional co-operatives” is retained as the base case, and the 
other is when the profile of a “representative new generation co-operatives” is retained as 
the base case. The “representative co-operative” represents the characteristics of the 
majority of NGCs and traditional co-operatives from the survey sample.  
If the co-operative shift its' policy of open membership to closed membership, 
keeping all other variables constant, the co-operatives are more likely to choose pooling 
practices. If traditional co-operative changes its’ policy from accepting any quantity of 
commodities to accepting fixed quantity of commodities, the co-operatives are most 
likely to choose “others” alternative but are unlikely to choose spot market cash price. 
Similarly, if co-operatives change their policy of non-transferability of stocks to 
transferability of stocks the co-operatives are more likely to choose “fixed forward price 
contract”. 
In NGCs, the number of members and quantity of commodity to be delivered by each 
member are restricted according to the needs of the co-operative business. Therefore, 
NGCs do not need to attract any new members by matching competitor’s price by 
offering spot market cash price. Members' in NGCs with an assured market for their 
commodities and expectation of higher returns from processing activities may not 
demand spot market cash prices. Furthermore, when co-operatives engage in processing 
activities, final returns will be realized only after the sale of final goods. Thus, the final 
return to the co-operative is uncertain at the time of commodity purchase. If the NGCs 
pay “spot market cash price” at the time of commodity delivery then co-operatives incur 
a risk of operating deficits and place pressures on their working capital. By paying a 
pooled price, co-operatives can avoid the risk of operating deficit and use less working 
capital. 
NGCs often have a closed membership policy, and accept fixed quantities of 
commodity from each member. Equity shares in NGCs can be transferred to any qualified 
member and the level of processing activities is higher in NGCs who responded to this 
survey. Traditional marketing co-operatives conversely often have open membership 
policy, accept any quantity of commodity, do not have a provision of transferable and 
tradable equity shares and are engaged in little or no value-added processing activities. In 
order to predict the type of pricing and payment options producers are likely to be offered 
if they join traditional marketing co-operatives or new generation co-operatives, choice 
probabilities for different pricing and payment alternatives were estimated when each 
type of co-operative had all their set of distinguishing characteristics. 
When producers deliver their commodities to traditional co-operatives, they are 
more likely to be offered the “spot market cash price” by co-operatives. The producers 
are more likely to be offered “pooled price” when producers shift their commodity 
delivery from traditional marketing co-operatives to new generation co-operatives. 
The impact of increased competition in the commodity market on the choice 
probability of pricing and payment practices is estimated for traditional marketing and 
new generation co-operatives using the multinomial logit model. Choice probabilities for 
both NGCs and traditional marketing co-operatives were estimated when they face six (6)   viii  
competitor firms and when they faced seven (7) competitor firms in their commodity 
market, keeping all other variables constant. 
With the entry of one additional firm into the commodity market, the choice 
probability of the spot market cash price increases the most for traditional marketing co-
operatives. The choice probability of pooling increases the most for NGCs. With the 
closed membership policy and fixed quantity commodity delivery contract, new 
generation co-operatives might have already arranged the total quantity of commodity 
needed to match their marketing and processing capacities. Therefore, with an increased 
number of buyers in the commodity market, new generation co-operatives may not have 
to match a rival’s pricing and payment practice, and may not need to pass on immediate 
benefits, to encourage members to deliver commodities in their co-operatives. Where as, 
in the case of traditional marketing co-operatives, with the provision of an open 
membership policy and accepting any quantity of commodity, members can deliver their 
commodities to anyone who offers better terms. With the increased number of 
commodity buyers, the co-operative may have to bid to match offers made by rival firms 
or may have to pass on immediate benefits in order to acquire sufficient volumes of 
commodity.  
 
5.0  Conclusion: 
 
Traditional marketing co-operatives address members’ cash flow needs and 
uncertainty of return. They are also more responsive to changes in the competitive level 
in the commodity market. With the open membership policy in traditional co-operatives, 
members are not obliged to deliver commodities to their co-operatives. In order to 
acquire sufficient volume of commodities, traditional co-operatives might have to match 
the rival firm’s pricing and payment offer. By paying the spot market cash price at the 
time of commodity delivery, co-operatives can acquire the needed volume of 
commodities and pass on the immediate benefit to members. With the spot market cash 
price members get the price of their commodities at the commodity delivery time. 
Member’s uncertainty of return is eliminated. However, by paying spot market cash 
prices traditional co-operatives may incur a risk of operating deficit due to output price 
risk and they may also need to outlay more working capital. These facts may act as a 
disincentive for traditional co-operatives to engage in further processing activities. 
NGCs are more concerned about avoiding co-operative’s risk of operating deficits 
and are not as concerned about the competitive level in their commodity market in the 
short run. As NGCs are engaged in value-added processing ventures, final returns of a co-
operative will be realized only after disposal of the final goods. There is price risk in the 
co-operatives’ output market. By restricting membership and putting restrictions on the 
amount of commodity a member can deliver, NGCs might have already arranged the 
required quantity of commodities for their processing and marketing facilities. Therefore, 
NGCs do not need to match the rival firm’s pricing and payment offer to attract the raw 
materials. In such a case, NGCs are more likely to be concerned with reducing the co-
operatives’ risk of an operating deficit. The pooling method, which eliminates the co-
operative’s risk of an operating deficit, could be an attractive alternative. Results of 
probability analysis shows that NGCs are more likely to choose a pooling option. 
However, the pooling method increases the member’s uncertainty of return. Members   ix  
might have joined NGCs to capture greater benefit. Furthermore, members in NGCs are 
required to make a significant up-front investment. Any pricing and payment practices 
that demand more working capital for co-operatives may pressure members to contribute 
more equity capital or increases co-operative reliance on debt financing. Since only 
viable co-operatives can pass on greater benefit to their members, pricing and payment 
practices that minimize the risk of an operating deficit may be justified for new 
generation co-operatives. 
 
6.0  Implications for Co-operatives: 
 
The information about source of capital obtained from frequency analysis could 
have significance for those thinking about formation of NGCs and marketing co-
operatives. The majority of co-operatives rely on external debt followed by retained 
earnings. Excessive reliance on debt could be risky for co-operatives when the net 
income of co-operative and interest rates both fluctuate. Co-operatives also have to outlay 
greater proportions of income for debt servicing. Existing or new co-operatives should 
focus on acquiring capital from internal sources, such as: issuing new shares, membership 
fees from existing and new members or issuing preferred shares to public where feasible. 
From the probability analyses, it is found that pooling is the most common pricing 
and payment contract among the NGCs. By offering pooling options, NGCs effectively 
minimize the co-operative’s risk of operating deficits from output price risks. However, 
pooling exposed members to risk of uncertain returns. In NGCs, equity shares allocate 
the right to deliver a certain quantity of commodity to the co-operative. These delivery 
rights represent a “dual contract”- the farmer must deliver a unit of commodity for each 
share purchased and the co-operative must accept and compensate the farmer for each 
unit delivered. If farmers fail to supply the amount contracted, farmers must purchase it 
elsewhere or have the co-op purchase it on their behalf. Farmers may fail to deliver the 
contracted volume either due to lower farm production or higher cash price offered by 
other firms in the market, which reduces the co-operative’s throughput (Zeuli 1999).  
Commodity delivery contracts for longer periods, heavy punishment in case of 
contract default, assurance of higher return from processed products and education of 
members about pooling process could maintain the member’s commitment to new 
generation co-operatives. Assurance of higher returns from final products may discourage 
members from taking short-term benefits by acting opportunistically. Members may have 
joined the NGCs with the expectation of higher returns. An NGC can assures higher 
return to members if it starts business with careful analysis of market conditions or where 
there are scarce investor-owned firms involvement. Many of NGCs in the USA are 
operating in niche markets such as pasta production, sugar beet processing, ethanol plant, 
specialty cheese, bison meat etc.  
By paying spot market cash price, a traditional co-operative reduces the price risk 
of members or producers, but increases co-operatives’ risk of operating deficits. Paying 
the spot market cash price also puts pressure on co-operatives’ working capital. In such 
cases, traditional marketing co-operatives may have to seek outside debt capital. This 
increases the financial risks for the co-operatives. Due to open membership policy and no 
obligation on the part of members to deliver their commodities, pooling may not be an 
appropriate pricing and payment contract especially if there are a number of other firms   x  
in the commodity market. Traditional co-operatives may choose such pricing and 
payment alternatives which demand less working capital and at the same time reduces the 
member’s risk of uncertain returns.  Traditional marketing co-operatives that plan to 
engage in further value-added processing activities, need to carefully evaluate their co-
operative structure and traditional methods used to pay for their inputs.  Converting to a 
NGC type structure, if feasible, may be a viable alternative to maximize the chance of 
success. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1  Background  
 
Agricultural marketing co-operatives are developed by farmers as a self-help business 
firm model to move product to market and influence price and other terms of trade while 
providing fair treatment and other benefits to members. These traditional marketing co-
operatives are owned and controlled by member producers for their own benefits. At the 
global and national level, agri-industry is being transformed into capital-intensive, value-
added and more market-driven businesses. At the same time, farm production has become 
more specialized, financing requirements for production have increased, and direct 
government support has been reduced in Canada. Although traditional marketing co-
operatives are believed to ameliorate the negative economic impact of market failure, 
they are facing the internal incentive problem, which discourages members from 
investing in their co-operatives. These internal incentive problems are created by the 
“vaguely defined property right” structure in traditional marketing co-operatives. Cook 
(1995) asserted that the inability to generate sufficient equity capital from members 
severely constrained the co-operatives’ ability to engage in capital-intensive and value-
added ventures. 
  During the early1990’s, with the concerted efforts of a number of key players 
committed to the growth and development of rural economies, the new wave of producer 
owned co-operatives emerged in the northern mid-west of the U.S.A. These new co-
operatives are named “New Generation Co-operatives” (NGCs). They are believed to 
ameliorate internal incentive problems associated with traditional marketing co-
operatives in generating equity capital and enable producers to capture a greater portion 
of consumer expenditure (Harris et al. 1996). Although these NGCs were able to solve 
the internal incentive problem associated with vaguely defined property right structure in 
traditional co-operatives, maintaining the member commitment is vital for survival of 
NGCs as well as traditional marketing co-operatives.  
Pricing of commodities and methods of payment for a commodity delivered by 
members is one important aspect of a co-operative’s business related to member’s 
satisfaction and commitments. Because pricing and payment practices dictate the timing 
and distribution of benefits, these affect the welfare of members and their commitment to 
co-operatives. New generation co-operatives are mostly engaged in value adding 
processing ventures; final returns will be realized only after the disposal of final outputs. 
Considerable time lag may exist between commodity delivery and realization of returns 
by members. In such a situation, assuring the higher returns and minimizing the co-
operative’s risk of an operating deficit is crucial for the survival of co-operatives. 
Co-operatives, either NGCs or traditional, have to secure sufficient volume of 
commodities for efficient utilization of their handling, marketing and processing 
facilities. In a typical agricultural market, co-operatives are not the sole business firm. 
There exist other co-operatives and investor oriented firms (IOFs) that compete with a 
co-operative’s businesses. In order to maintain the commitment of members and prevent 
them from leaving co-operatives, co-operatives have to take into consideration the pricing 
and payment practices of their competitors while choosing their own pricing and payment 
practices.   2
This study seeks to identify the factors affecting co-operative’s choice of particular 
pricing and payment practices with the members. It also aims to investigate any 
differences in payment and pricing practices between new generation co-operatives and 
traditional marketing co-operatives. 
 
1.2 Research Problem 
 
Members’ commitment is key to the survival of any co-operative business. There 
are various factors, which affect the members’ commitment to their co-operatives. 
Pricing and payment contracts between members’ and their co-operative for commodity 
supplied by members could be one aspect of members’ commitment. Because pricing and 
payment practices dictate the timing and distribution of benefits, this affects the welfare 
of members and their commitment to co-operatives.  
Traditionally, marketing co-operatives have been paying the spot market cash 
price at the time of commodity delivery or delaying payment until costs and return are 
determined; i.e., pooling (Cobia 1989). When co-operatives pay spot market cash price at 
the time of commodity delivery, member’s risk of commodity price will be reduced, but 
the co-operative bears the risk of operating deficits due to price risk in the output market. 
Co-operatives also need to maintain more working capital under this scheme. Torgerson 
et al. (1998) reported that some new generation co-operatives (NGCs) in the Mid-West of 
U.S.A. had experienced operating deficits by paying the market price at the commodity 
delivery time. Income received from final product sales was not sufficient to cover the 
price paid to members. Therefore, paying the spot market cash price at the time of 
commodity delivery may threaten the long-term viability of co-operatives, especially 
those engaged in processing ventures.  
When co-operatives arrange payment through a pooling mechanism, the risk of a 
co-operative operating in deficit due to price risk in the output market will be eliminated. 
As well, co-operatives do not need to maintain as much working capital as they must 
when using spot cash price payment methods. However, the producer member faces 
uncertain return because a considerable time lag exists between the commodity delivery 
and realization of final returns, and final returns are subject to the price level in the output 
market. Those members having strong time preference for cash may not like the pooling 
practice. They do not know how much they will get until several months after commodity 
delivery. Balancing the risk and return between co-operative and its’ members is a crucial 
task in maintaining member’s commitment. The types of pricing and payment contract 
chosen by co-operatives clearly have an impact on this balancing act.  
The presence of other firms, either co-operatives or profit-oriented firms who use 
the same commodity as do co-operative, increases the competition to buy producers’ raw 
commodity. Cobia (1989) asserted that cash price payment at the time of delivery is 
popular when producers have several marketing alternatives. With increased competition 
to buy a producer’s commodity, members may contract to those firms who offer better 
alternatives in terms of risk, return and other services. Therefore, with increased 
competition in the commodity market, balancing the risk and return between member 
producers and co-operative is more crucial. 
Besides pooling and spot market cash price methods, there are other pricing and 
payment options available to co-operatives. A “Fixed forward price” contract is one of 
such alternatives. In this contract, members agree to deliver a commodity at a specified   3
time in the future for a pre-specified price. This contract alleviates the risk and 
uncertainty of final returns on the part of members but co-operatives still face the risk of 
operating deficits (Unterschultz et. al. 1997). Co-operatives face the risk of operating 
deficits due to risk of default on contract terms by the member, and output price risk. 
Members may default when the spot market price at the time of delivery is higher than 
the contract price. 
 “Guaranteed minimum price” contract is another pricing and payment alternative 
for co-operatives. Under this price contract, farmers contract to deliver a quantity of 
commodity of a certain quality within a specified time frame at a guaranteed minimum 
price. The minimum price contract is a cash contract offering “floor price” protection 
while allowing increased profits from price or basis appreciation. Essentially this “floor 
price” contracting is a type of put option (Purcell and Koontz 1999).  
In basis contracts the producer and co-operative lock in the basis while the cash 
price is left open with the stipulation that the cash price must be at a basis against a 
selected futures contract. Basis is simply the difference between market cash price and 
future prices (Purcell et al. 1999). In this contract, the producer does not lock in a final 
price so producers are subject to all the many factors, which can affect the market. 
Therefore, a lower price could be a result for the producer.  
The “Hedge-to-arrive contract” is another contract, in which a co-operative or 
commodity buyer hedges the commodity for the producer in the futures market and 
allows the producer to fix the basis prior to delivery of commodity. However, this 
contract has been a failure for many co-operatives and grain elevators in the Mid-Western 
states of the United States (Blue et al. 1998). Failure of this contract was particularly 
attributed to the inability of co-operative to assess old-crop-new crop futures price spread 
risk. Co-operatives and grain elevators designed the contract for multiple crop years 
based on the future price of old crops. High futures price followed by low futures price 
led to sharply lower prices for farmers than expected, especially those locked in multiple 
crop year contracts (Lence et al. 1999). 
Different pricing and payment contracts have differential impact on co-operatives 
and their members in terms of risk, return and managing working capital. Maintaining the 
members commitment without jeopardizing economic viability of co-operatives is crucial 
for survival of any type of co-operative. 
Relatively few studies have been done on pricing and payment practices of co-
operatives. Fulton et al. (1998) from their studies indirectly indicated that due to 
increased competition in commodity markets, some co-operatives have started to offer 
some innovative marketing alternatives to their members. These innovative alternatives 
include: fixed forward price contract, minimum price contract, hedge-to-arrive contract 
and delayed pricing and payment contract. The inability of co-operatives to implement 
other marketing contracts was cited as a lack of know how about the operation of these 
marketing alternatives among co-operative’s managers. Very little information is 
available about factors affecting choice of different pricing and payment contract by co-
operatives. It is essential to recognize the important factors, which are responsible for 
choosing a particular pricing and payment contract by co-operatives. Better 
understanding of important factors will enable the policy maker to better analyze the 
conditions under which co-operatives choose a particular pricing and payment practice.   4
The factors under analysis are demographic variables related to different co-operative 
organizations, and market environments.  
 
1.3  Objectives 
 
The overall objective of this study is to investigate the differences in choice of 
pricing and payment practices of different co-operative organizations for the commodities 
delivered by members.  
 
The specific objectives of this study are as follows: 
 
i)  To analyze the factors affecting pricing and payment practices in traditional 
marketing and new generation co-operatives. 
ii)  To investigate the differences in pricing and payment practices between new 
generation co-operatives and traditional agricultural marketing co-operatives. 
iii)  To analyze the relationships between degree of competition in commodity and 
output market with co-operative’s choice of particular pricing and payment 
practices. 
 
1.4  Hypotheses 
 
This study aims to test the following three hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: 
New generation co-operatives are engaged in value-added processing ventures 
and aim at returning greater proportions of consumer expenditures to producer members. 
Final returns of a co-operative will be realized only after disposal of final goods. There is 
price risk in the co-operative’s output market. In addition, there often exists a two-way 
contract between members and co-operative regarding quantity and quality of commodity 
to be delivered into co-operatives. Since membership is closed, co-operatives do not need 
to offer market cash price to acquire additional commodity and members may have 
agreed to join with the expectation of higher return. The new generation co-operatives are 
more concerned with reducing the risk of their operating deficits. The pooling method, 
which eliminates the co-operative’s risk of operating deficit, would be the best 
alternatives for the new generation co-operatives.  
 





Traditional marketing co-operatives are characterized by an open membership 
policy and they accept any quantity of commodity from members. Members are not 
necessarily obliged to deliver their commodities to co-operatives. In order to acquire 
sufficient volume of commodity, traditional marketing co-operatives may offer such 
pricing and payment options which reduces commodity price risk for members. Paying 
the spot market cash price at the time of delivery is the best alternatives for co-operatives.   5
Members realize the full commodity price at the time of delivery, which removes the 
uncertainty of returns. 
 





With an increased number of firms in commodity market, members have a 
number of alternatives for selling their commodity. Members will deliver or sell to those 
buyers who offer the best alternatives. With the closed membership policy, new 
generation co-operatives might have already arranged the commodity requirement for 
their marketing and processing facilities through contracts with members. Therefore, the 
new generation co-operatives do not need to bid to match the pricing and payment 
practices of rival firms. With an open membership policy and no obligation by members 
to supply their commodity to co-operatives, traditional marketing co-operatives are more 
responsive to the level of competition in the market to acquire a sufficient volume of 
commodity. Co-operatives may want to acquire sufficient volume of commodities in 
order to operate the marketing and processing facilities efficiently. 
 
“Traditional marketing co-operatives are more responsive to the competitive level in 
their commodity market than NGCs when choosing a pricing and payment practices”. 
 
Many references (Cobia 1989, Fulton 1997) in the literature discuss the statements 
presented in hypotheses 1,2 & 3. However, very little empirical evidence has been 
presented to substantiate these claims. Therefore, this study aims to verify the statements 
presented in three hypotheses. 
 
1.5  Nature of analysis 
 
To meet the objectives mentioned in section 1.3 and to test the hypotheses 
developed in section 1.4 of this chapter, mail questionnaires were sent to traditional 
marketing as well as new generation co-operatives of the U.S.A. and Canada. Three 
analytical methods are used to examine the effects of different co-operative structures and 
level of competition on co-operatives’ choice of particular pricing and payment practices; 
these are: mean score comparisons, factor analysis and the multinomial logit analysis.  
Traditional marketing and new generation co-operatives differ in membership policy, 
commodity contract and transferable equity stocks. So mean scores were compared 
between these distinguishing characteristics to test the hypotheses. Similarly, 
probabilities from multinomial and rank logit models were used to test the hypotheses.  
 
1.6  Organization  
 
  This report is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 1 has provided the background 
to the study and introduced the nature of the problem. The second chapter introduces the 
history of development of co-operatives and problems faced by co-operatives in a 
changing agri-food industry. This chapter also discusses the development of new   6
generation co-operatives and their ability to solve the problems faced by traditional co-
operatives. 
  The third chapter briefly discusses the theoretical background about optimal price 
and commodity purchase decisions under different market structures. Different pricing 
strategies for co-operatives are also discussed with their implications for maximization of 
members’ welfare. This chapter also discusses the different pricing and payment 
alternatives practiced by co-operatives and private commodity handlers along with their 
implications for distribution of risk and return between members and co-operatives. 
  The fourth chapter explains the survey design, methods of data collections and 
methods of data analysis. There is a discussion on the selection of the study area, an 
explanation of the sample selection process, outline of the questionnaire and explanation 
of the method of data collection. 
  Preliminary results from analysis of the data are presented in Chapter 5. The sixth 
chapter provides the results of data analysis from statistical and econometric methods. 
This chapter also discusses the implications for different co-operatives. The final chapter 
summarizes the important findings of the study and its implications for co-operatives. 
This chapter also discusses the limitations of the study. 
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CHAPTER 2: EVOLUTION OF AGRICULTURAL MARKETING  CO-OPERATIVES 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
The main objective of this chapter is to discuss the background of co-operative 
development in agriculture, problems faced by agricultural marketing co-operatives in a 
changing agri-food industry and the development of new generation co-operatives in 
North America. It also briefly discusses the importance of pricing and payment practices 
on the survival of co-operatives.  
 
2.2 Development and Rationale for Formation of Marketing Co-operatives in 
Agriculture 
 
The first co-operative with systematic operating principles was established in 
1844 in England, and it was known as the Rochdale Society. The Rochdale Society was 
established as a consumer co-operative selling primarily consumer goods such as food 
and clothing. The Rochdale Society was established because of dissatisfaction with the 
retail shopkeepers in their community (Barton 1989). According to Torgerson et al. 
(1997), agricultural marketing co-operatives were evolved as a self help business firm, 
and were designed to move product to market and influence price and other terms of 
trade. 
Agricultural commodity prices are more volatile than are the prices of most non-
farm goods and services, because demand for farm produce is price inelastic in the short 
run. Therefore, small changes in supply may induce large price changes (Tomek et al. 
1990). Because of the biological nature of farm production and asset fixity, farmers 
cannot adjust their farm production plans rapidly with changes in prices, which leads to 
cyclical output price relationships for most agricultural commodities (Tomek et al. 1990). 
The need for institutional mechanisms to counter the economic ramifications of excess 
supply-induced prices and to countervail opportunism and hold out situations due to 
market failure are also cited as reasons for the formation of agriculture co-operatives. 
Farmers were also organized because services were not available to them in their rural 
communities or because those services were not available at reasonable costs (Cook 
1995; Schrader 1989). 
Organizational structure and objectives may differ from co-operative to co-
operative and from country to country. However, the most common features of traditional 
co-operatives are: 
 
-  The stockholders, who are farmers, are the major users of the co-operative’s 
services. 
-  Members receive benefits from level of patronage rather the level of equity capital 
contribution. 
-  The formal governance of the business by the stockholders is structured 
“democratically” based on one member one-vote systems. 
Therefore co-operatives are unique business organizations, owned and controlled by 
users for the benefit of users. 
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2.3  Changing Agri-food Industry and Implications for Traditional Marketing Co-
operatives 
 
At the global level, agriculture is undergoing a process of industrialization. The 
following are some major elements of transformation in agri-food business mentioned by 
Boehlje (1997). 
 
i)  Farm production is becoming increasingly capital intensive. 
ii)  Specialization and separation of production stages.  
iii)  Decisions made by firms at all levels of the market are increasingly 
interdependent. 
iv) Contractual  arrangements  among  different players in food chain. 
v)  Decreasing government supports to farming. 
vi)  Deregulation of industries and reduction of trade barriers. 
These changes have resulted in increased vertical integration and contracting in 
the agri-business sector (Stefanson et al. 1997). The emergence of greater contracting and 
vertical integration raises the question about control and power. Stefanson et al. (1997) 
asserted that because of information, resources and bargaining power possessed by large 
agribusiness firms, an individual farmer is less likely to negotiate contract terms in 
his/her favor. With greater contracting, farmers also face new risks, such as the 
possibility that a processor will change the contract terms once farm production has 
occurred, and this is often named as the “hold out problem”. This risk increases as the 
assets needed for agricultural production become idiosyncratic. 
These structural changes in the agri-food industry and their ramification on the 
farm sector suggest that farmers need to become more involved in the processing of 
agricultural products than they have been to date. Farmers that continue to be involved 
only in farm-level production will find themselves being increasingly subject to control 
from agricultural processors. However, it is difficult for an individual farmer to be 
involved in the processing of agricultural products. Large-scale involvement in these 
activities takes much more capital, time, and expertise than is available to any single 
farmer. Stefanson et al. (1997) argued that although farmer involvement in processing 
activities can take many forms, one way for farmers to become involved in processing 
activities is through co-operatives.  
However, Cook (1995) argued that traditional marketing co-operatives are facing 
the internal incentives problem, which creates disincentives for members to invest in their 
co-operatives. These incentive problems emanate from the user-versus-investor set of 
“vaguely defined property rights” (VDPR) structure in traditional co-operatives. The 
vaguely defined property right structures are responsible for three main problems in 
traditional marketing co-operatives. These are i) Free rider problem ii) Horizon problem 
and iii) Portfolio problem. Brief discussions of these three problems are below. 
 
i)  Free Rider Problem: 
 
When property rights are untenable, insecure, or unassigned, the free rider 
problem emerges. This is a situation in which property rights are not sufficiently well 
defined and enforced to ensure that current member-patrons bear the full costs or benefits 
of their actions.  This situation occurs particularly in open membership co-operatives   9
(Cook 1995). In open membership co-operatives free rider problems surface under two 
situations. One is when an individual refuses to join co-operatives but captures the 
benefits of improved terms of trade set by co-operatives. The other situation occurs when 
new entrants are entitled to the same payment per unit of patronage as existing members. 
This set of equally distributed rights combined with the lack of a market to establish a 
price for residual claims creates an intergenerational conflict. Because of the dilution of 
the rate of return to existing members, a disincentive is created for them to further invest 
in their co-operative. 
 
ii)  Horizon Problem: 
 
The horizon problem occurs when a member’s residual claim on the net income 
generated by an asset is shorter than the productive life of that asset. This problem is 
caused by restrictions on transferability of residual claimant rights and lack of liquidity 
through a secondary market for the transfer of such rights. Due to the horizon problem, 
members become reluctant to invest in the co-operative and instead demand redemption 
of equity invested by them (Cook 1995). This increases the pressures on a co-operative’s 
working capital and precludes co-operatives from undertaking profitable growth 
opportunities. 
 
iii)  Portfolio problem: 
 
Portfolio theory assumes that investors are risk averse and chooses the asset that 
has the lowest variance for a given expected income, or alternatively chooses assets 
which maximize return for a given level of risk. Through this strategy of asset 
diversification investors optimize their portfolio decision. Equity investment in a co-
operative can be viewed as an another asset in the producers’ investment portfolio. Due 
to the lack of transferability and appreciation mechanisms of residual claims, co-
operative members are not able to diversify or concentrate their asset portfolios to reflect 
their personal preferences for risk. Members can benefit only from their level of 
patronization rather than level of capital contribution in a traditional marketing co-
operative. Therefore, capital gains are not a major benefit for stock ownership in co-
operatives, in contrast to investor-owned-firms (IOFs). This unique equity structure and 
benefit distribution system creates disincentives for members to invest in their co-
operatives.  
 
2.4  Evolution of New Generation Co-operatives in North America 
 
Although traditional co-operatives were successful in correcting the negative 
economic impacts of market failure, the problems arising from vaguely defined property 
right structures have created disincentive for members to invest in their co-operatives 
(Hackman et al 1990; Cook 1995). With the concerted efforts of key persons, producers 
in mid-western U.S.A. started developing a new co-operative organizational form that 
attempts to reduce the costs associated with the traditional organizational structure of co-
operatives. This new organizational form is known as the “New Generation Co-
operative”(Hackman et al. 1990). New Generation Cooperatives (NGCs) differ from   10
traditional marketing cooperatives in three aspects. These are i) Closed membership ii) 
Tradable membership shares iii) Engaged in value-added processing ventures. 
 
i)  Closed membership:  
 
NGCs are market driven, in that market demand for the processed product 
determines the appropriate scale of the business and which, in turn limits the size of the 
membership, so that these become closed co-operatives.  
 
ii)  Tradable membership rights: 
 
In order to patronize NGCs, one must purchase delivery rights or membership 
shares. Each unit of membership share allows producers to deliver a specified volume 
and quality of farm produce to co-operatives. These tradable membership shares not only 
allocate rights to deliver units of the commodity, but also spread up-front capitalization 
responsibilities equitably among members according to level of patronage. Furthermore, 
these rights are tradable, which allows members to adjust their risk preferences. 
 
iii)  Engaged in value added ventures: 
 
In contrast to traditional marketing co-operatives, researchers claim NGCs are 
involved in value added processing ventures. A common reason for the formation of 
NGCs is the desire to develop new value-added products and to gain access to an 
increased share of the consumers’ food dollar (Harris et al. 1996).  
So far more than fifty (50) new generation co-operatives have formed in the mid-
west region of the U.S.A.  Fulton (1990) claimed that despite the interest in the new 
generation co-operative model in the prairie region of Canada, there are very few 
examples of the formation of new generation co-operatives in Canada. 
New generation co-operatives evolved to correct the negative incentive problems of 
traditional marketing co-operatives and to provide a higher return to members. Types of 
pricing and payment practices chosen by co-operatives are crucial for the survival of new 
generation as well as traditional co-operatives. As discussed in Chapter 1, different 
pricing and payment options have differential impacts on the distribution of risk and 
return between co-operatives and their members. Traditional marketing co-operatives 
have an open membership policy and are often not engaged in processing activities to 
greater extent. New generation co-operatives are closed member co-operatives and are 
often engaged in processing activities to greater extent. The differences in organizational 
structure of co-operatives and operations method may affect the choice of pricing and 
payment practices.   11
 
CHAPTER 3: MARKETING STRATEGIES, AND PRICING AND PAYMENT 
PRACTICES OF CO-OPERATIVES: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter analyzes the optimal quantity of a commodity purchased by co-
operatives under two different market structures: perfectly competitive and monopsonist 
commodity markets. This chapter will also discuss the various maximization strategies of 
co-operative’s objective functions and, different pricing and payment contracts between 
co-operatives and their members for commodities supplied by members. 
 
3.2  Optimal Commodity Purchase and Price Level  
 
 The industrial organization theory of structure-conduct-performance assumes that 
the optimum price and output level of any firm is affected by the market structure under 
which it is operating. Characteristics of the organization of a market, which influence the 
nature of competition, influence the behavior of an individual firm (Tirole 1990). For the 
theoretical analysis of pricing and payment practices of marketing co-operatives, it is 
assumed that the co-operative can be treated just like any other firm and that it has an 
objective function to maximize. The role of a marketing co-operative is to purchase the 
raw material (X0) from the members at a price (Px), transform it into a finished product 
(Y) via a production function and then sell it on some final market at a price (Py). In 
undertaking this role, the co-operative incurs fixed costs of F. Since the co-operative is 
formed for the benefit of the members, the primary objective of the co-operative should 
be to maximize the welfare of its members. Taking producer surplus as a measure of the 
well being of the members, the welfare of the members will be maximized if the 
following goal is achieved (Fulton 1995). 
Maximize  Π + = PS W …………………. (3-1) 
where Π is the profit of the co-operative, W is the member’s total welfare and PS is the 
producer surplus of the members. It is an area under the price and above the supply curve 
(Figure 3-2). 
Levay (1983) quoted Taylor’s argument that members are owners as well as users 
of co-operative. As owners, they desire to maximize the profit of co-operatives, and as 
users to maximize the producer surplus. Co-operative’s maximization problem also 
implies that co-operatives should maximize the producer surplus of members and profit 
of co-operative business in order to maximize the welfare of their members. Objective 
functions of marketing co-operatives as analyzed by Fulton (1995) are given below. 
In a competitive market the profit function of a co-operative is given by: 
F X P Y P x y − − = Π 0 …………………………………….…..  (3-2) 
where: Py is the per unit price of output. 
Y= Quantity of output produced from raw material X. 
F= Fixed cost of producing Y. 
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dX X P =  Variable cost of producing X0.  
Substituting equation (3-2) and (3-3) in equation 3-1 gives the following: 
Maximize  F X P Y P dX X P X P W x y
X




) ( …..….... (3-4) 
After some algebraic iterations expression 3-4 can be written as: 





y F dX X P Y P W ………………………… (3-5) 
The economic interpretation of this maximization problem is one of maximizing the 
revenue from the sale of the final product, less the variable costs of producing commodity 
(X0) and less the fixed costs of producing final goods (Y). 
A co-operative’s strategies to maximize the welfare of members may be different 
under a different market structure. Schmiesing (1989) compares the optimal pricing and 
quantity of commodity purchase decisions on marketing co-operatives under two 
different market conditions, monopsonistic and competitive. These are discussed next. 
3.2.1  Competitive Commodity Market  
 
Before deriving the optimal price and quantity solutions, it is necessary to 
understand the concept of the Average Net Revenue (ANR). Average net revenue (ANR) 
represents the amount that the co-operative has available to return to the co-operative 
members for each unit of commodity delivered by members. It is obtained by subtracting 
variable processing cost and fixed cost from sales revenue of final goods (excluding cost 
of raw commodity) and dividing by quantity of raw commodity used in processing.  
X






Where m(X) represents the variable processing and marketing costs excluding the cost of 
the raw commodity. 
Assume a co-operative is one of numerous smaller firms purchasing the raw 
product (X). In such a situation, the co-operative cannot influence the price it pays for 
inputs and has to pay the same price as other competitors are paying. Therefore, input 
price is given and the supply curve for the co-operative becomes horizontal. Horizontal 
supply curve means co-operative can purchase any quantity of input at given price. It also 
implies that the level of producer surplus is fixed. In order to maximize producer welfare, 
the co-operative must maximize profits as do investor oriented firms (IOFs). A co-
operative can maximize its profits if it chooses an input purchase level such that marginal 
benefit from additional input is equal to the given price of input. The solution to a co-
operative’s welfare maximization problem can be derived by solving the first order 
conditions of a co-operative’s profit functions (expression 3-2). 
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where: Px is a per unit price of raw input. 
MPP= Marginal physical product. It is an increment in the total output with increased in 
input by one unit. 
MVP= Marginal value product. It is a marginal benefit to the co-operative of using an 
additional unit of input X (commodity). 
In Figure 3-1 at a given price of Px the co-operative will purchase X amount of 
raw product from producers. With this level of input the co-operative will maximize the 
profits from the sale of the final output Y. Co-operatives will make profit equal to the area 
of  abcPx. With a similar production function, an investor-oriented-firm (IOF) also 
chooses the same level of quantity, as does the co-operative. The difference is that for the 
co-operative any profits that are earned are returned to the member patrons, while for the 
profit-maximizing firm the profits are returned to the shareholders who may or may not 
patronize the firm. With this solution a co-operative member receives price of Px and the 
patronage refunds equal to distance a-Px for each unit of commodity. 
In the perfectly competitive market, excess profits are earned in the short run 
only. In the long run, the existence of profits will attract new firms to purchase the 
commodity from the producer. As new firms enter the industry, the demand for the input 
will shift outward, which in turn will bid up the price of the commodity. Price will be bid 
up until no profits are made by firms and the industry will be in long run equilibrium. 
3.2.2  Co-operative as Monopsonist 
 
Agriculture is a spatially dependent industry and the markets for products are 
regionalized. Therefore, attaining a perfectly competitive equilibrium commodity market 
is unlikely. Markets that appear to be competitive on a national basis may actually have 
local markets with considerable market concentration. In addition, industry entry barriers 
may make long-run competitive equilibrium impossible (Schmiesing 1989). In such 
markets, marketing co-operatives are confronted with an upward sloping supply curve 
(Figure 3-2). 
When a co-operative is the only buyer of a producer’s raw product then the co-
operative can maximize the member’s welfare by equating marginal benefit of input to 
marginal cost of producing that input. The marginal benefit of input is the marginal value 
product (MVP). The marginal cost is the change in  ∫ +
0
0
) ) ( (
X
F dX X P  for a change in X0. 





dX X P  for a 
changed in X0. Thus, the optimal price and quantity purchase of a commodity can be 
derived by setting the expression 3-5 equal to zero after taking a partial derivative. 






















where: S = supply curve of producers and is summation of all individual member’s 
marginal cost curves.  
In Figure 3-2, the supply curve for all producers equates to MVP curve at point C.  
A co-operative pays price  x P'  and obtains X1 amount of raw produce. If it pays the 
members an amount  x P'  per unit of X1, then there remains an amount (a- x P'  ) which is 
the profit per unit of X1 utilized. The total profits of the co-operative are equal to the area 
abc x P'  and these profits are paid to the members as the patronage payment. 
For the monopsonist investor oriented firms (IOFs), the marginal cost is not given 
by the price but by the marginal input cost (MIC). Marginal input cost is the change in the 
amount the profit-maximizing firm must lay out for the inputs in order to be able to 
produce the output. If the investor-oriented firm is the only one in the commodity market 
then it will maximize the firm’s profit by equating marginal value product with marginal 
input costs. 
.. MIC MVP = ………………………………………… .(3-9) 
In figure 3-2, the profit-maximizing monopsonist sets the commodity price at 
x P" , purchase X2 quantity of commodity and makes the total profit equal to the area of 
feg x P" . Because the profit-maximizing monopsonist realizes that obtaining more units 
of input will raise the price of all units, the firm will restrict the use of input (X0). The 
result is that the profit-oriented monopsonist will purchase less than will perfectly 
competitive profit-oriented firms and monopsonist co-operatives. The result of 
monopsony pricing by a profit-maximizing firm differs from a co-operative in at least 
three ways. The first is a reduction of producer surplus due to a lower price for 
commodity ( x P" ). The second effect is the producers no longer receive the profits that 
are generated. Third, all of society is made worse off because there is a deadweight 
(triangle area of cgh) due to the monopsony power of investor oriented firms. 
A comparison of the co-operative outcome with that of the profit-maximizing 
firm suggests that the co-operative is a mechanism for remedying monopsony power. The 
co-operative is able to fulfill this role because it takes account of the impact its’ decisions 
have on members. Since the owners of the profit-maximizing firm do not patronize the 
firm, the profit-maximizing firm is under no such obligation to consider the effect its 
decisions will have on raw input supplies. Yet, by acting as a monopsonist, the profit- 
maximizing firm does have an impact on these producers, decreasing the price paid to 
them and thereby reducing their welfare. The co-operative, on the other hand, by 
internalizing this cost, is able to more correctly balance the impact such decisions have 
on the welfare of the various groups in the industry. 
 
3.3  Pricing Strategies of Co-operatives 
3.3.1 Maximum Net Price Objective 
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It is often suggested that the co-operative should maximize the price that it pays to 
the members (Cobia 1989). In Figure 3-3 a co-operative can maximize the price paid to 
the members and still break even if it sets price equal to the maximum level of Average 
Net Revenue (ANR). The solution for this objective is point a where MVP and ANR 
intersects, which set Px1 as the price of the commodity. Price Px1 is the greatest per unit 
amount the co-operative can pay out to members. If this price is actually paid to 
producers, the producers will supply X2 quantity of commodity. Co-operatives can avoid 
the lower price from oversupply by two means. The first is to pay a maximum price Px1, 
but restrict the amount of output each member can produce or deliver to the co-operative, 
i.e., production contract. The other solution is to set a price equal to Px2, where price 
equals marginal cost and return dividend payments of (Px1-Px2) per unit of commodity 
delivered (X1). However, this latter solution will only work if producers clearly 
distinguish between the price paid for their raw commodity and patronage payment, 
otherwise the co-operative again needs to restrict the quantity of input supplied by 
members. It appears that co-operatives can offer the highest possible price to members 
only if membership is closed and the co-operative accepts a fixed quantity of commodity 
from each member. 
While both of these solutions will give producers the maximum price possible for 
their output, the member welfare is not maximized. At an output level X1, the marginal 
value product (MVP) curve is lying above the marginal cost curve (supply curve) so the 
marginal benefit of another unit of raw commodity (X) is greater than the marginal cost. 
Hence, the welfare of the members could be increased if the co-operative increased the 
purchase of commodity from X1 to X3 level. Levay (1983) also posited that co-operatives 
could offer maximum prices only if members’ supply curve pass through the apex of the 
ANR curve, which would happen only under long-run perfect competition. 
3.3.2  Marginal Value Product Pricing 
 
Marketing co-operatives can maximize co-operative’s profit and producer surplus 
by equating MVP with the supply curve (S) at point d (Figure 3-3) by which Px3 price is 
achieved and the co-operative accepts the X3 quantity of commodity. Since the marginal 
benefit of using the commodity is equal to its supply price, this solution is also pareto 
optimal. Producer members receive two payments: a price for the raw material (Px3) and 
a patronage refund (dePx1Px3). If the members do not separate these two payments, then 
members tend to supply more commodity (X2). Therefore, this solution seems unstable. 
However, if co-operatives pay an increased price to members, then it will not have 
sufficient revenue to cover its fixed costs. The price at commodity level X2 (at point b) 
clearly exceeds the ANR due to increased supply (X2) from members. Co-operatives 
cannot maintain this strategy unless they restrict output and clearly distinguish dividends 
from the commodity sold to the co-operatives. 
3.3.3  Average Revenue Pricing 
 
Levay (1983) claimed that average net revenue pricing of members commodity is not 
a deliberate strategy of co-operatives’ maximization problem. However, the average 
revenue pricing (ANR) objective is achieved when co-operatives have an open   16
membership policy and accept any eligible quantity of commodity. This average pricing 
can be obtained by equating the ANR curve of co-operatives with the aggregate supply 
curve(S) of members. At point g (Figure 3-3) ANR equates with supply curve (S), 
members supply X4 amount and receive Px4 price per unit of commodity. With this 
pricing mechanism, the amount supplied by the members is consistent with the amount 
that the co-operative can afford to purchase. However, no profits are being made by co-
operatives and hence no patronage payments are returned to the members. The result is 
that the price paid by co-operative is the effective price that members base their output 
decisions on. The level of commodity purchased by the co-operative is higher under this 
pricing than maximum net price and marginal value product pricing rule. At equilibrium 
point g (Figure 3-3), the supply curve (S) exceeds the marginal value product (MVP) 
curve, which implies the marginal cost of another unit of raw material exceeds its 
marginal benefit.  The ANR pricing rule is not pareto optimal. While the level of 
producer surplus obtained by members is greater under average revenue pricing than 
under marginal value product pricing, the members are actually worse off. The loss of 
patronage payments is greater than the gain in producer surplus. In figure 3-3, with ANR 
pricing objective total welfare is only the producer surplus, which equals to area fgPx4. 
With MVP pricing, total welfare equal to patronage refund plus producer surplus, which 
is equal to area fdPx3 plus area dePx3Px1. The gain in producer surplus with ANR pricing 
dgPx4Px3 is less than the loss in patronage payment edPx1Px3. Area edg is the 
deadweight loss due to ANR pricing, which is also mentioned by Vercammen et al. 
(1996). Thus, members could be made better if the level of output could be reduced to 
X3. 
Marginal value product pricing and Average Revenue Pricing strategies are both 
legitimate co-operative policies and both achieve business at cost (Cobia et al 1989). The 
choice depends on the co-operatives’ objectives, methods to generate equity capital, cost 
structure, competitive environment, and ability to forecast costs. Cobia et al. (1989) 
claimed that most co-operatives in the U.S. follow a marginal value product pricing rule 
for the following reasons: (i) fear of retaliation from competitors (ii) desire to finance 
growth of co-operative through retained member patronage earning and (iii) to avoid free 
rider problem by nonmembers. 
Other co-operatives have chosen to use net average revenue pricing for the following 
reasons: (i) co-operative’s desire to exert competitive behavior on investor oriented firms 
(ii) to encourage members to patronize co-operative with an immediate benefit for 
members. 
Vercammen et al. (1996) claimed that the consequences of average net revenue 
(ANR) pricing are likely to be severe, particularly for capital intensive processing co-
operatives. Finally, if members do not see the patronage payment as part of the price paid 
for the raw commodity then a pricing rule approaching MVP=MC may be more 
appropriate. However, the above theoretical analysis of the optimal pricing and quantity 
purchase of commodities did not take into considerations member’s and co-operative’s 
risk, timing of payment and need for working capital. The following section discuss the 
different pricing and payment contracts between members and co-operatives, along with 
their impact on the distribution of risk between a co-operative and its members. 
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3.4  Pricing and Payment Contract in Marketing Co-operatives 
 
A pricing and payment contract in marketing co-operatives involves the method 
of setting price and arrangement of payment for commodity supplied by members. 
Pricing and payment contracts dictate timing and distribution of income among members. 
Type of pricing and payment contracts have a differential impact on distribution of risk 
and return between co-operatives and its members (Cobia et al. 1989). Perceptions of risk 
and uncertainty about co-operative’s final return, member’s cash flow needs, working 
capital requirement of co-operatives, degree of market competition and behavior of rival 
firms may play important roles in a co-operative’s choice of a particular pricing and 
payment contract with its members. 
In marketing co-operatives, paying the cash price for commodities on delivery or 
delaying payment (pooling) until costs and income are determined, have been two 
popular methods (Cobia 1989). However, with increased competition in commodity 
markets and the need to address risk and return of members and co-operatives, some co-
operatives are offering more innovative marketing alternatives to their members. They 
are: i) Fixed forward price contracts, ii) Minimum guaranteed price contracts, iii) Basis 
contracts and iv) Hedge-to-Arrive contracts. Brief discussions of the different pricing and 
payment contracts between marketing co-operatives and their members are discussed 
next. 
3.4.1  Spot Market Cash Price 
 
In a market cash price at the time of commodity delivery practice, co-operatives pay a 
cash price for and take title to products delivered by patrons. These products are then 
processed to a greater or lesser extent and sold in the market at the most advantageous 
price. Net income remaining after expenses is refunded to patrons. The policy of cash 
payment at delivery is popular when producers have several marketing alternatives and if 
members or farmers have strong time preference for cash (Cobia 1989). If there are a 
number of other firms who purchase the same commodities from farmers, then those 
firms are likely to bid away commodity from co-operatives by offering attractive 
marketing alternatives to farmers. This type of pricing and payment practices is 
consistent with average net revenue (ANR) pricing discussed in the preceding section. 
ANR pricing aims at passing the immediate benefit (higher commodity price) to 
producers. By offering the spot market cash price, co-operatives can pass on immediate 
benefits to producers. With the spot market cash price, producers can realize the price of 
their commodity immediately, thus the price risk is eliminated. Although a farmer’s 
uncertainty about future return is removed, additional risk of uncertain final return and a 
requirement of more working capital for co-operatives are drawbacks of cash at delivery 
system (Cobia 1989).  
 
3.4.2  Delayed Payment or Pooling 
 
Pooling is a delayed-payment scheme often involving signed-marketing contracts 
(Cobia 1989). Farmers sign marketing contracts with the co-operative whereby the   18
producers guarantees delivery of all or part of their production to the pool. The contract 
transfers all authority over marketing decisions to the co-operative and its professional 
management. An initial advance is paid to members upon delivery of the product. One or 
more progress payments may be made as the product is sold out of inventory. When all or 
most of the product has been sold the pool is closed, and a total value is determined for 
the pool. Operating and administrative expenses are allocated and subtracted. Any excess 
over previous payments is then distributed to patrons. This final payment results in zero 
net income for the co-operative (Cobia.1989). This payment scheme reduces the price 
risk and requirement of operating capital for the co-operative. Similarly, producer 
members share risk and marketing expenses, and receive a uniform average per unit price 
irrespective of the timing of delivery.  
Whether the pooling practice is consistent with the any of the pricing strategies 
discussed in the preceding section depends upon the type of membership policy and 
commodity delivery contract. If a co-operative has an open membership policy and 
accepts any eligible quantity of commodity, then any of the pricing strategies practiced 
by co-operatives will end up with average net revenue (ANR) pricing, as claimed by 
Levay (1983). However, if a co-operative restricts the membership and quantity of 
commodity delivery, the pooling practices conforms with marginal value product (MVP) 
pricing or maximum price objectives (MVP=ANR). The maximum price objective is 
unlikely to be achieved in the short-run unless the member’s supply curve passes through 
the apex of ANR curve (Levay 1983). 
In spite of their benefits, pools are not adapted to all circumstances and not all 
growers want to participate in them. Members sometimes do not like the system because 
they do not know what they will receive until several months after delivery. Some 
producers may not wish to delegate the responsibility of marketing their products to a 
specialist; nor do they want to commingle the results and thus forgo some short-term 
opportunities.  
3.4.3  Fixed Forward Price Contract 
 
Under a fixed forward price contract members agree to deliver a commodity at a 
specified time in the future for a pre-specified price. Unlike futures contracts, forwards 
are not traded on an exchange. A futures contract only locks in a price while a forward 
contract locks in a price and a basis. Forward contracts are used for hedging and for price 
speculation. Farmers may enter in forward contracts to reduce a price risk and co-
operatives may enter in expectation of making a profit (Unterschultz et al 1997). By 
offering forward price contracts co-operatives assume the price risk and counter party 
risk. The latter may arise when farmers do not honor the contract obligations. Farmers 
may default on contracts when farm production fails or when the open market price 
exceeds the contract price. In the case of a contract between a farmer and private or 
profit-oriented firms, the producer has locked in a fixed price, and the farmer cannot reap 
the benefit of increased prices. The co-operative may hedge with futures or negotiate with 
buyers in the co-operative’s output markets to offset the risk of fixed forward price 
contract.   19
3.4.4  Guaranteed Minimum Price Contract 
 
Under a minimum price contract, the farmers signs a minimum price contract. The 
minimum price contract involves the producer contracting to deliver a quantity of 
commodity of a certain quality within a specified time frame at a guaranteed minimum 
price. This contract may involve the use of the options market. The producer does not 
purchase the option. Instead, the co-operative may purchase the underlying put option for 
the minimum price contract while at the same time passing on the benefits and costs of 
the option to the producer. The minimum price contract is similar to a forward contract 
with three major exceptions: The producer now has the opportunity to: 
-  Benefit from increase in the futures price, but is protected from major price drop. 
-  Benefit from an improvement in basis and,  
-  There is a cost or premium to pay for the underlying option. 
3.4.5  Basis Contract 
 
Basis is the difference between the local cash price and the relevant futures price 
(Tomek et al. 1990). The basis contract is a written agreement between the producer and 
co-operative or commodity merchant in which the basis is set. In other words, the 
producer and co-operative or commodity merchants agree upon how many cents below a 
selected futures contract the final selling price will be. The cash price for the commodity 
is left open with the stipulation that the cash price must be at a basis against a selected 
futures contract (Jones, Ohio State University ). The “Basis Contract” gives producers the 
opportunity to “stay in the market” until such a time as they can take advantage of price 
increases in the futures market. With the basis contract producers can take advantage of a 
favorable local basis situation and have the opportunity to gain from an increase in the 
future price. However, a basis contract does not lock in a final price.  
3.4.6  Hedge-to-Arrive Contract 
 
The hedge-to-arrive is a marketing contract that offers producers an opportunity 
to lock in a referenced future price when it is considered attractive (Blue et. al 1998). The 
hedge-to-arrive contract can be thought of as a type of forward pricing alternative 
whereby the basis will be locked in at a future date, generally prior to delivery rather than 
at the time of signing the contract. As such, there remains the opportunity to experience a 
basis gain or loss from the time of contract initiation to contract close. The farmer 
establishes a price at the initiation of this cash contract. The price selected by the farmer 
will be some futures crop price, presumably insuring adequate returns above costs, minus 
the basis fixed by the farmer.  
  This contract would be a viable alternative if future prices are expected to decline 
and basis strengthens. With hedge-to-arrive contracts, the futures price is locked in and 
producers are subject to basis risk. Requirements of more working capital to meet the 
increased margin calls due to unprecedented increase in commodity price is one demerit 
of hedge-to-arrive contract for co-operatives (Barett 1997).  
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3.5  Implications for Study 
 
The literature suggests the main objective of marketing co-operatives is to 
maximize the welfare of members. From the above analysis, without restricting the 
membership and controlling the supply of commodity, co-operatives are unlikely to attain 
their maximization objectives. Moore et al. (1995) also claimed that without restricting 
memberships and quantity of commodity purchased, co-operatives are unlikely to transfer 
the benefits of transferable delivery rights to members. From the above analysis, it also 
appears that some pricing and payment practices are risky for members but not for co-
operatives, and some are risky for co-operatives but not for members. A proper balance 
of risk distribution between co-operatives and their members is crucial for maintaining 
members’ commitment without jeopardizing the co-operatives’ economic goals. As 
discussed in the concluding sections of Chapter 2, organizational structure and operations 
of co-operatives may also dictate the choice of particular pricing and payment practices.  
New generation co-operatives are usually closed member co-operatives and are 
often engaged in processing activities, in which final returns will be realized only after 
the disposal of final goods produced by co-operatives. The final returns are subject to 
output price risk. Zeuli (1999) concluded from her simulation studies that members 
joined NGCs in order to reap greater returns rather than manage commodity price risks. 
This finding is consistent with the analyses of pricing objectives in Section 3.3. Closed 
member co-operatives are likely to practice maximum price (MVP=ANR) or marginal 
value product (MVP) pricing strategies with the aim to pass a greater benefit to members. 
If NGCs pay spot market cash price with the aim to pass immediate benefit to members, 
then it assumes the risk of operating deficits. Therefore, NGCs might choose such pricing 
and payment alternatives which minimizes the co-operative’s risk of operating deficits. 
With the objective of passing greater benefit to members and at the same time avoiding 
operating deficits, NGCs are likely to choose pooling practices (Hypothesis 1 in Chapter 
1). 
Traditional co-operatives on the other hand are usually open member co-
operatives in which members are not obliged to deliver commodities into co-operatives. 
Traditional marketing co-operatives thus might have to match the offer of other firms in 
order to acquire a sufficient volume of commodity. They might have to pass on 
immediate benefits to members in order to attract the greater volume of commodities. 
They are likely to set price paid to members equal to average net revenue (ANR). They 
may choose a pricing and payment alternative, which minimizes the member’s risk and 
uncertainty of returns. By paying spot market cash prices a traditional marketing co-
operative can pass on the immediate benefit to members, and thus eliminate the 
member’s uncertainty of return. Therefore, traditional marketing co-operatives are more 
likely to offer spot market cash price, to attract greater volume of commodities 
(Hypothesis 2, Chapter 1).  
  Theoretical analysis in this chapter shows that co-operatives’ optimal conditions 
for quantity of commodity purchase and price paid to members varies with different 
market structure and co-operative’s objectives. With the open membership policy, 
traditional marketing co-operatives have to match the pricing and payment policies of 
other firms in order to acquire sufficient volume of commodities. Alternatively, with 
closed membership structure, NGCs might have already arranged the total commodity   21
requirement for their processing facilities so they don’t need to match the offers of other 
firms to acquire the additional raw commodities. Therefore, it is hypothesized that 
traditional marketing co-operatives are more responsive to changing competitive level in 
the commodity market (Hypotheses 3, Chapter 1). 
Co-operatives are unlikely to maximize the welfare of their members without 
controlling the supply of commodities and restricting the memberships. Different pricing 
and payment practices have differential impacts on the distribution of risks between co-
operatives and their members. Therefore, it is expected that different co-operative 
organization and market structures have impacts on a co-operative’s choice of pricing and 
payment alternatives. 





























Figure 3-2: Quantity purchased and price paid for commodity when cooperative & IOF is 



















                                                      
1  Where MVP is marginal value product, MIC is marginal input cost, ANR is average net revenue and S is 
supply curve.   23
 
CHAPTER 4.0: SURVEY DESIGN, DATA COLLECTION, AND ANALYTICAL 
METHOD: 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
  This chapter discusses the design of the survey, method of data collections and 
analytical methods employed. This chapter consists of three sections. The first section 
discusses the survey design and pre-testing. The second section discusses the method of 
data collections and the third section discusses the empirical method used to analyze the 
data. 
 
4.2  Survey Design 
 
The written survey (Appendix E) was designed to elicit information on each co-
operative’s choice of particular pricing and payment practices. The questionnaires were 
designed according to information needed to fulfill the objectives of the study and to test 
the hypotheses. The survey questionnaire has two sections. The first section of the 
questionnaire progressed from general inquiries about the co-operatives’ demographic 
characteristics to market structure. It is hypothesized that new generation and traditional 
co-operatives might have different choices for pricing and payment practices. These two 
co-operatives differ in several demographic variables, so questions were asked to elicit 
information on these differential characteristics of co-operatives. These differential 
characteristics include: membership policy, commodity delivery contract, provision of 
transferable equity shares, proportions of commodity processed and year of business 
operations. Except for the proportions of commodity processed and year of business 
operations all variables were elicited in binary responses; i.e. in “0” and “1” form. 
Information on other demographic variables were also elicited (refer to questions 
2,6,8,9,10,1,12,16,17,18,19, 21,22,23 and 24 in appendix E). 
From a literature review of pricing and payment practices for commodity 
delivered by members in co-operatives as well as by private commodity handlers 
(Chapter 3), six pricing and payment alternatives have been identified. These are: spot 
market cash price, pooled price, fixed forward price contract, guaranteed minimum price 
contract, basis contract and hedge-to-arrive contract. Respondents were asked to rank 
these alternatives according to the most commonly used alternative in their co-operatives. 
The range of ranking for seven alternatives was 1-7, in which alternatives ranked as 
number “1” indicates that alternative is the most commonly practiced, and alternatives 
ranked as number “7” indicates that alternative is least commonly practiced in co-
operatives. Open ended questions were also asked in section 1 of the questionnaire, to 
elicit the information on reasons for maintaining a particular membership policy, doing 
business with a non-member, conditions for transferring or trading equity shares, 
mechanisms of equity revolving plan and reasons for differential price payment.  
The second section of the survey questionnaire includes the close-ended questions 
to elicit information on co-operative’s perceptions about the importance of various 
factors which play a role in a co-operative’s decision to choose a particular pricing and 
payment practice. Responses on these factors were measured on a 1-5 likert scale, where 
“1” indicates the factor under consideration is “not important at all” and “5” indicates   24
“very important” for co-operatives. The Likert scale is widely used in the measurement of 
attitudes, attitude differences, brand image, store image and other similar phenomenon in 
marketing research (Menezes et al. 1979). The Likert scale detects the intensity of feeling 
that respondents have about their attitudes (Albaum 1997). Fulton et al. (1993) used a 5 
point likert scale to elicit the perceptions of co-operatives’ members and to investigate 
the factors influencing members’ commitment to the co-operatives. Information was 
elicited on factors related to market environment in which co-operatives do business, 
managing co-operative’s working capital, risk and return, incentive for members to 
deliver to co-operatives and co-operatives’ business philosophy. 
Similar types of closed-ended questions were included at the end of section 2 to 
elicit the perceptions of co-operatives’ about the success of their pricing and payment 
policy to meet various objectives. These objectives are: maintaining member 
commitment, providing higher returns to members, meeting competitors’ prices for 
commodities, and maintaining the desired volume and quality of commodities. This 
information was also elicited in 1-5 rating scale, where “1” indicates “very unsuccessful” 
and “5” indicates “very successful”. An open-ended question was included in section 2 
asking the general description and special circumstances of pricing and payment practices 
adopted by co-operatives. 
The questionnaire was revised a number of times. Pre-testing was done with two 
marketing co-operatives in the Edmonton area in order to determine the approximate time 
needed to fill out the questionnaire, and to ensure that the questions were easy to answer 
and well understood by the respondent.  
 
4.3  Data Collection 
 
Varieties of methods were considered for data collection. Conducting an in-
person interview with the manager or director was considered expensive. Identifying the 
persons involved in decision making of co-operatives and arranging the time for 
interview is difficult. Because co-operatives are scattered over wide geographical areas, 
to visit the different co-operatives at an appointed time is difficult from a logistical point 
of view. Telephone surveys were considered inappropriate for this study. Arranging the 
time for interview with managers and directors is considered difficult. From the pre-test it 
was known that it takes twenty minute to answer all questions. Therefore, conducting a 
telephone survey with almost two hundred co-operatives is also time consuming and 
costly. A mail survey is another alternative considered for this study. Although there is a 
degree of uncertainty concerning the response rate, mail survey technique is considered 
efficient in terms of costs. Aaker et al. (1998) claimed that a mail survey yielded more 
accurate results because the mail questionnaire is answered at the respondent’s discretion, 
the replies are likely to be more thoughtful and others can be consulted for necessary 
information. Mail survey was chosen over interviewing managers and directors of co-
operatives. 
Names and addresses of three hundred (300) traditional marketing as well as new 
generation co-operatives were collected from various sources (Secretariat of Co-operative 
Canada, Center of Co-operative Studies, University of Wisconsin, Alberta Agriculture 
Research Institute and web address of University of Minnesota). Co-operatives from the 
Mid-West region of United States such as Minnesota, North and South Dakota, Missouri,   25
Iowa and Nebraska were selected, because these regions have experienced the formation 
of new generation co-operatives. For Canada, co-operatives from the provinces of British 
Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Ontario were included. Co-operatives 
were contacted by telephone in order to verify their mailing address and request their 
consent for survey. Initially, the member relations officer or purchasing manager of co-
operatives were targeted for first contact. At the time of telephone contact, names of the 
contact person who could fill out the questionnaire were asked. The objectives of the 
survey and approximate time needed to fill out the questionnaire were explained at the 
time of telephone contact. Altogether one hundred and ninety five (195) co-operatives 
agreed to participate in the survey. In the third week of January 2000, questionnaires 
were mailed to the co-operatives that agreed to participate. Questionnaires were 
addressed to the people who were identified as a contact person from the telephone 
inquiry. 
A follow up telephone call was made in the last week of February to those co-
operatives that had not returned the survey questionnaire. By the end of March 2000, 
ninety-three of the co-operatives had responded to the questionnaire, a response rate of 48 
percent.  
 
4.4  Analytical Method 
 
This section discusses the various methods of data analysis used in this study. The 
methods employed to analyze various information are mean score comparison, factor 
analysis, the multinomial logit and rank-logit analysis. 
4.4.1  Mean Score Comparison 
 
There are applications for which it is desirable to compare the means of two 
different sample populations. In order to identify the differences in perceptions of various 
types of co-operatives on the importance of factors in choosing the particular pricing and 
payment practices, the mean scores given to different variables were compared. Similar 
kinds of mean score analyses were done on responses elicited to understand the co-
operative’s perceptions of effectiveness of their pricing and payment practices in meeting 
various objectives. According to Berenson et al. (1996) mean score comparison tests the 
following hypotheses. 
 
H0 :  0 2 1 = − µ µ (There is no difference between mean score of sample 1 and 2) 
H1 :  0 2 1 ≠ − µ µ  (There is a difference between mean score of sample 1 and 2).  
Before testing differences between two means, it is necessary to test the equality 
of variance. A hypothesis test for the difference between two means from samples that do 
not have equal variance has more inherent variability than samples from populations with 
equal variances. According to Berenson et al. (1996) hypothesis for testing equality of 











1 σ σ ≠  (Variances of sample 1 and 2 are not equal)   26
If the null hypothesis of equality of variance is rejected using an F-test, then the t-
statistics estimated from separate variance assumptions instead of pool variance should 
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SP  ………………………………. (4-3) 
where: 
i µ = mean of group i. 
i n  = number of observations in group i. 
2
i S = sample variance in group i. 
2
P S = pooled variance of sample 1 and 2. 
where equation (4-1) is t-statistics under the assumption of equality of variance, and 
equation (4-2 ) is t-statistics under the separate variance assumption. 
4.4.2  Factor Analysis 
 
Factor analysis is a method of transforming the original variables into new, non-
correlated variables, called factors. The essential purpose of factor analysis is to describe 
the variation among many variables in terms of a few underlying but unobservable 
random variables called factors (Jobson 1992). One measure of the amount of 
information conveyed by each factor is its variance. The objective of the factor analysis is 
to generate a first factor that explains the maximum variance. Then, with the first factor 
and its associated loading fixed, factor analysis will locate a second factor that maximizes 
the variances it explains. The procedure continues until there are as many factors 
generated as there are variables (Aaker et al. 1998). Factor analysis can also be viewed 
as a statistical procedure for grouping variables into subsets such that the variables within 
each set are mutually highly correlated, whereas at the same time variables in different 
subsets are relatively un-correlated (Jobson 1992).  
  The two most commonly employed factor analytic procedures in marketing 
applications are principal component analyses and common factor analyses. If a 
researcher’s objective is to summarize information in a larger set of variables into fewer 
factors, principal component analysis method is used. On the other hand, if the 
researcher’s objective is to uncover underlying dimensions surrounding the original 
variables common factor analysis is used. Principal component analysis is based on the 
total information in each variable, where as common factor analysis is concerned only 
with the variance shared among all the variables (Aaker et al. 1998). 
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4.4.2.1  Model for Common Factor Analysis 
 
The model for common factor analysis is composed of three sets of variables: a 
set of p observed variables X1, X2,…..,Xp with mean vector µ  and covariance matrix Σ 
) ( p p× ; a set of r unobserved variables called common factors  , ,..... , 2 1 r F F F  where r <p, 
and a set of p unique but unobserved  factors  . ,...., , 2 1 p U U U  The model is given by p 
equations (Jobson 1992): 
1 1 2 12 1 11 1 1 ...... ) ( U F F F X r r + + + + = − λ λ λ µ  
2 2 2 22 1 21 2 2 ...... ) ( U F F F X r r + + + + = − λ λ λ µ  
..                                                        ……………………………… (4-4) 
Up F F F X r pr p p p p + + + + = − λ λ λ µ ...... ) ( 2 2 1 1  
 
or equivalently in matrix notation 
     u f X + = − λ µ) (  ………………… (4-5) 
where: 
µ , X  and U  are  ) 1 ( × p  vectors,  
f is the  ) 1 ( × r  vector of linearly independent common factors,  1 , = j Fj ,2, ….., r; 
λ is the  ) ( r p×  matrix consisting of the unknown factor loading. 
A particular coefficient, ij λ , of λ  is called the loading of the i




The unobservable factors F and U must satisfy the following assumptions to meet the 
orthogonality condition: 
F and U are independent 
, 0 ) ( ) ( = = u E f E   I ff E = ) ' ( , where I is a  ) ( r r× identity matrix and  
Ψ = ) ' (uu E , where Ψ is a  ) ( p p× diagonal matrix with elements 
2
ui σ , 
 i= 1,2,…,p; 
iv)  0 ) ' ( = uf E , no correlation between unique factors and common factors; 







2 2 2 σ λ σ ……… (4-6) 
  Hence the variance is divided into two parts. The first part in equation 4-6 is the 
variance explained by the common factors and is usually referred to as the communality. 
The second term is called the unique variance or specific variance. All the covariance or 
correlation are explained by the common factors. Some of these factors are assumed 
common to two or more variables. The unique factors are then assumed orthogonal to 
each other and they do not contribute to the co-variation between variables. Only 
common factors contribute to the co-variation among the observed variables (Kline 
1994). 
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4.4.2.2  Factor Rotation 
 
Usually the initial factor extraction does not give interpretable factors. Factor 
rotation is usually done to get an interpretable factor-loading matrix (Jobson 1992). If a 
researcher can make the larger loading larger than before and the smaller loading smaller, 
then each variable is associated with a minimal number of factors. The variables that load 
strongly together on a particular factor will indicate a clear meaning with respect to the 
subject area at hand. If several factors have high loading on the same variables, it is 
difficult to ascertain how the factors differ and unique factors are not obtainable.  
Upon factor rotation, the variance explained by each un-rotated factor is simply 
rearranged by the factor rotation. Although the factor matrix and percentage of variance 
accounted for by each factor does change, the communalities and the percentage of total 
variance explained do not change. There are a number of factor rotation techniques in 
use, they are: Varimax, Quatrimax, Oblique and Equamax. The varimax method of 
rotation is used for producing orthogonal factors that approach the simple structure 
objective (Jobson 1992) and is the most widely used method of factor rotation. Varimax 
aims to maximize the sum of variances of squared loading in the columns of the factor 
matrix. This produces in each column, a loading that is either high or near zero (Kline 
1994 ). 
 
4.4.2.3  Determining the Number of Factors 
 
Several procedures have been proposed for determining the number of factors to 
be retained. These procedures include: the eigen-value,  scree plot and percentage of 
variance criteria. Among these three procedures, an eigen-value one criterion is the most 
commonly used method (Jobson 1992). An eigen-value represents the amount of variance 
in the original variables that is associated with a factor. In other words, eigen-value 
represents the sum of the square of the factor loading of each variable on a factor. Under 
the eigen-value one criteria only factors that account for variances greater than one are 
retained. Aaker et al (1998) notes that, a factor with an eigen-value less than one is no 
better than a single variable, since, due to standardization, each variable has a variance of 
1. Therefore, a factor should explain at least the amount of variance in one variable; 
otherwise it is better to have the original variable.  
 
4.4.2.4  Factor Scores 
 
One output of most factor analysis programs is the values for each factor for all 
respondents or observations. These values are termed factor scores. For subsequent 
analysis it may be convenient and appropriate to work with the factor scores instead of 
original variables. Factor analysis reduces the number of variables to a few underlying 
constructs. For respondent k, the score for the j
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Where  ik X  is the standardized value of the i
th variable for case k and  ji W  is the factor 
score coefficient for the j
th factor and the i
th variable.   29
Factor scores estimated from expression (4-7) are included in the multinomial 
logit model to help estimate predicted and marginal probabilities of choosing a particular 
pricing and payment alternatives by co-operatives. Responses measured in 1-5 likert scale 
about the co-operative’s perceptions on importance of various factors in choice of pricing 
and payment methods were used for common factor analysis using varimax factor 
rotation method. 
The important strength of the factor analysis is, it can identify the underlying 
constructs in the data and can reduce the number of variables to a more manageable set. 
Factor analysis can help researchers to determine the redundant variables. The greatest 
limitation of factor analysis is that it is a highly subjective process (Aaker et al. 1999).  
 
4.4.3 Multinomial Logit (MNL) Analysis 
 
Ranked responses on seven methods of pricing and payment by co-operatives 
were elicited (Question # 20, Appendix E). A Multinomial Logit model was employed to 
estimate the probability of ranking the alternative as number “1” or the probability of 
choosing the alternative as the most preferred one. However, responses on alternatives 
“Guaranteed Minimum Price”, “Basis Contract” and “Hedge-to-Arrive Contract” ranking 
these as the most common practice (ranked as “1”) were very few, so responses on these 
two alternatives are merged into the “Others” category. For the MNL model full ranking 
information was not used. As such, four pricing and payment practices, viz. spot market 
cash price, pooled price, fixed forward price contract and others were considered as 
dependent variables for estimation of expression (4-8). The estimation of the MNL model 
requires the normalization of one of the parameter set in order to identify the parameters 
of the model (Huang and Fu 1995, and Greene 1997). In this study, the regressions 
coefficients for alternative “OTHERS” was normalized and chosen as the base. As such, 
the probability of choosing a particular pricing and payment alternative as the most 
common practices by co-operatives can be estimated by the multinomial logit model 




















 for j=1,2,3,4  ………………………. (4-8) 
where the Pr(j) is the probability of co-operative's choice of a particular pricing and 
payment practice, as the most common method j; Xi represents a set of demographic 
variables of co-operatives, and  j β  is a vector of unknown parameters (Huang and Fu 
1995). This assumes that alternative given a rank of “1” are chosen and the other 
alternatives are not chosen. 
The estimated coefficients ( s ' β ) from expression 4-8 only represents the relative 
movement between a pair of choice outcomes with “Others” being the reference pricing 
and payment alternative. The sign and magnitude of coefficients estimated from the   
MNL model are not straightforward to interpret (Huang and Fu 1995). The sign of the 
estimated coefficient does not necessarily indicate the increase or decrease in the 
probability of choosing the j
th alternative. Predicted probability of choosing alternative j   30
can be estimated by expression (4-8) and marginal effects of changes in one of the 

























where Pr (j) is the probability of a co-operative choosing the j
th  pricing and payment 
practices. 
As such, the marginal effect measures the shift in the probability of an outcome 
with respect to change in a given regressor. However, it should be noted that some 
variables in the models are measured in terms of dummy variables (0’s and 1’s). “In the 
case of continuous variable a unit change approximates a small change, thereby the 
partial derivatives measures the marginal effect; while in the case of a dummy variable 
the only change is from 0 to 1 and 1 to 0, a 100% change” (Liao 1994, P.:20). Taking the 
partial derivative of a dummy variable tends to overestimate the marginal effect. Thus, 
the marginal effects on the event of probability estimated by expression 4-9 only provides 
an overall impression of the effects of characteristics on a choice of a particular pricing 
and payment practice. A more accurate approximation of the effects of a change in a 
dummy variable on choice probabilities can be accomplished by looking at the changes in 
the predicted probability of a “representative co-operatives” when the characteristics (Xk) 
is equal to 1 and when it is equal to 0 (Liao 1994). This representative co-operative 
represents the characteristics of an average co-operative in the sample, regardless of their 
choice of pricing and payment practices. The latter method of evaluating marginal 
probabilities is used in this study.  
4.4.4  Rank Logit Model 
 
  As mentioned in the preceding section, ranked responses on seven pricing and 
payment alternatives were elicited. Responses on rank cannot be modeled with an 
ordinary least square (OLS) regression model because of the non-interval nature of 
dependent variables. Including all ranked responses in a multinomial logit model fails to 
account for the ordinal nature of dependent variables (Greene 1993). Respondents were 
asked to rank the given alternatives, so dependent variables are not inherently ordered. 
Therefore we can not use an ordered probit and logit model. 
  Ben-Akiva et al. (1992) argues that to estimate discrete choice models from 
ranking data, one must identify the correct relation between ranking and choice 
probabilities. If the choice behavior underlying each rank position satisfies Luce’s Choice 
Axiom, the probability of a ranking can be easily linked to the choice probabilities, and 
the multinomial logit (MNL) structure provides the appropriate model. 
According to Ben-Akiva et al. (1992) if the probabilistic choice process 
generating ranking data follows Luce’s Choice Axiom, a ranking of J alternatives is 
equivalent to the following sequence of independent choice tasks: the alternative ranked 
first is chosen over all the other alternatives, the second ranked alternative is preferred to 
all others except the first ranked, and so on. Decomposition of a ranking probability in 
terms of choice probability follows: 
}) , 1 { | 1 ( ...... })........ ., ,......... 3 , 2 { | 2 ( }) ,....., 2 , 1 { | 1 ( ) ,........, 2 , 1 ( J J J P J P J P J P − − =    31
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Where P(1,2,…..,J) is the probability of observing the rank order of alternative 1 being 
preferred to alternative 2, alternative 2 preferred to alternative 3, and so on, and 
P{j|j,j+1,……,J}  is the probability of alternative j being chosen from the set of 
alternatives  {j,j+1,…….,J}.  Luce’s axiom implies that choice probabilities follow the 
structure of the MNL model. This means that all the choice probabilities in equation 4-10, 
P(j,j+1,…….,J}), j=1,….,J-1, can be derived from the same logit model. The ranking 
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Equation 4-11 is used to estimate the probability of choosing alternatives when the 
responses on dependent variables are in ranked form.  
Essentially, both multinomial logit model and rank logit model estimates the 
probability of choosing a particular alternative. Rank logit model is used when the 
responses on dependent variables are in ranked order. Both multinomial logit and rank 
logit models were estimated whether there is any differences in estimated parameters and 
probabilities. Ben-Akiva et al. (1992) and Layton (2000) argue that in the rank-logit 
model the reliability of parameters estimated from the ranking information decreases as 
ranks are added. They asserted that respondents rank lower-valued alternatives with less 
care than higher-valued alternatives or that they are simply more “sure” of their first few 
choices than they are about their last few choices. 
One important issue in the use of multinomial logit models is the assumption of 
independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA). This IIA assumption follows from the 
initial assumption that the disturbances are independent (Liao 1994). Since rank-logit 
model is an extended version of multinomial and conditional logit model, it embodies the 
same potential problem (Layton  2000). Assumption of IIA implies that the probability of 
choosing one alternative should be independent from choice probability of other 
alternatives, which is known as independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). However, 
if two or more alternatives are close substitutes then the assumptions of IIA could likely 
to be violated and MNL model would not be inappropriate (Kennedy 1992). Therefore, 
researcher should keep the IIA in mind when estimating MNL models. 
Hausman’s specification test is used to test the inherent assumption of the IIA. 
The procedure is, first, to estimate the model with all choices. Then estimate the model 
with a smaller set of choices but with the same regressors (Greene 1993). The test 
statistic is: 
] [ ] [ ]' [
1 2
u r u r u r V V β β β β χ − − − =
− ……………. (4-13) 
where subscript r and u indicates the estimators based on the restricted subset and 
unrestricted subset respectively, Vs are the estimates of the asymptotic covariance   32
matrices. The statistic is asymptotically distributed as chi-squared with K degrees of 
freedom. However, due to the nature of the data and amount of grouping that was done to 
the data, the IIA test is not conducted. 
 
4.5  Chapter Summary 
 
A questionnaire was designed to elicit information on differential demographic 
characteristics of traditional and new generation co-operatives. Besides demographic 
characteristics of co-operatives, information on level of competition and differential price 
payment were also asked. Closed-ended questions were also asked to elicit the co-
operative’s perceptions about the importance of various factors in the choice of pricing 
and payment contracts. Mail questionnaires were sent to one hundred and ninety five 
(195) traditional marketing as well as new generation co-operatives in the U.S.A. and 
Canada. Four analytical methods are used to analyze the various types of data collected 
from the mail survey. These methodologies are mean score comparison, factor analysis, 
the multinomial logit analysis and the rank logit model.   33
 
CHAPTER 5: DATA RESPONSES AND DATA DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES. 
 
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses the response rate on section I of the survey and responses 
to each questions except the type of commodities purchased and sold by co-operatives. It  
also describes the frequency distribution of responses on various questions from the 
survey. As discussed in Chapter 2, only co-operatives having a closed membership 
policy, accepting a fixed quantity of commodity and with the provision of transferable 
equity stocks are named as “New Generation Co-operatives” (NGCs). The number of 
pure NGCs are very few, therefore the frequency analysis of responses on various survey 
questions were done on differential characteristics of traditional and new generation co-
operatives. 
 
5.2  Response Rate of Survey 
 
In the initial sample, questionnaires were sent to 195 co-operatives. These co-
operatives were identified by initial telephone contact. At the time of telephone contact 
forty (40) co-operatives were identified as NGCs and one hundred fifty five (155) were 
identified as traditional co-operatives. Ninety three (93) co-operatives returned the 
questionnaire, a return rate of almost 48.0%. Among those returned, nine questionnaires 
were blank. Analyses and discussion of results is based on eighty four (84) 
questionnaires, which accounts for more than 43% of the surveyed sample. Table 5-1 
shows the response rate by country and by type of co-operative.  
Table 5-1 shows that among the co-operatives who responded to the survey 
questionnaire, ten (10) co-operatives are pure NGCs (closed member, accept any quantity 
and transferable equity stocks). This accounts for 25% of surveyed NGCs. Forty nine 
(49) co-operatives are pure traditional co-operatives (open member, accept any quantity 
and non-transferable equity stocks), which accounts for more than 31% of surveyed 
traditional co-operatives. Twenty five (25) co-operatives have mixed characteristics of 
NGCs and traditional co-operatives. Considering the limited sample size, these responses 
can be considered as relatively representative of the targeted population. 
 
5.3  Respondents of Survey: 
 
While taking the consent from co-operatives before mailing the questionnaire, co-
operatives were asked the name of person to whom the mail questionnaire should be 
addressed. It was assumed that either the general manager or board of directors plays an 
important role in decision making process. Therefore, it was expected that either 
managers or board of directors would answer the questions. Eighty two (82) respondents 
indicated their role in the co-operatives. Figure 5-1 shows the majority of respondents 
who answered the questions on behalf of their co-operatives were managers (76), four 
respondents reported that they are members of the board of directors, and two were in 
others category.  
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5.4  Demographic Features of Co-operatives 
 
According to Figure 5-2, sixty two of the surveyed co-operatives have an open 
membership policy, 66 of them accept any quantity of commodity delivered by members, 
43 of them are engaged in some kind of processing activity, 57 co-operatives do not have 
a provision for transferring and selling the equity owned by members, 65 co-operatives 
accept commodity from non-members and 59 the of surveyed co-operatives have an 
equity revolving plan to redeem the member’s equity capital.  Figure 5-3 shows that the 
majority of open membership co-operatives in both Canada and U.S.A. cited that open 
membership is the “co-operative’s philosophy” as the main reason for adopting an open 
membership policy (Question # 4, Appendix E). The other cited reasons are: open 
member and more volume ensures efficient operation of co-operatives and increased 
bargaining power. Figure 5-4 shows that the main reason cited for a closed member 
policy by the majority of co-operatives is to match the marketing and processing facility 
of co-operatives (Question # 5, Appendix E). The other reason for closed membership is 
“controlling the quality of commodity”. A greater proportion of Canadian closed member 
co-operatives cited the “controlling the commodity quality” as one reason for closed 
membership than U.S. closed member co-operatives.  
Based upon the qualitative responses (Question # 8, Appendix E) the majority of 
co-operatives with the provision of transferable equity shares indicated that transfer or 
sale of equity must be approved by the Board of Directors of the co-operatives. The buyer 
of equity must be able to supply the required quantity and quality of commodities to co-
operatives. Members can sell equity to anyone but existing members in co-operative or 
co-operatives themselves have first right to purchase.  
Open member co-operatives indicated that they purchase commodities from non-
members to generate additional return for members, to gain new membership and to 
generate more volume of commodities to meet increased market demand (Question # 6, 
Appendix E). They also indicated that accepting the commodity from everyone is the co-
operative’s policy. Closed membership co-operatives accept commodity from non-
members only when the co-operative is short of raw produce, when member’s 
commodities are not ready to deliver to the co-operative or when a member defaults on 
delivery commitments to the co-operative. 
Co-operatives who do not have an equity revolving plan indicated that member’s 
in co-operatives do not hold equity positions (Question # 8, Appendix E). This is because 
the co-operative paid out all equity except membership fees at the year end. Some co-
operatives cited that since members can sell their equity through the open or the stock 
market, co-operatives are not required to redeem equity. 
Co-operatives who have an equity revolving plan cited that the Board of Directors 
(BoD’s) decide at each year-end to revolve equity back to members based on the 
financial position of co-operative (Question # 9, Appendix E). Generally equity is 
redeemed in full either after the death of a member or when a member reaches a specified 
age. In other cases, a certain percentage of equity each year is regularly paid back to 
members throughout the period following a revolving cycle. The length of the revolving 
period is specified by the Board of Directors of the co-operative.  
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5.5  Number of Years of Business Operations 
 
According to information presented in Table 5-2, the mean years of operation of 
closed member and fixed quantity delivery contract co-operatives are 27.45 and 11.8 
years respectively. The mean years for the open member and unlimited quantity delivery 
contract co-operatives are 61.29 and 62.11 years respectively.  
 
5.6  Member Size Distribution 
 
Table 5-2 shows that the mean member size of co-operatives with open member 
or unlimited commodity delivery contract or non-transferable equity share are 3779, 3439 
and 3726 respectively. The mean member size of co-operatives with closed member or 
fixed commodity delivery contract or transferable equity shares are 722, 782  and 
2444.47 respectively. It appears that co-operatives having characteristics of NGCs have a 
smaller membership than co-operatives having characteristics of traditional marketing co-
operatives.  
Figure 5-5 also shows that a greater proportion of closed membership and fixed 
quantity commodity delivery contract co-operatives are in a member size group of 1-500 
than co-operatives with open membership and unlimited quantity commodity delivery 
contract. On average, Canadian co-operatives in the survey are bigger than U.S. co-
operatives in terms of size of members. This observation may be due to the small number 
of Canadian co-operatives that responded to the survey and a few of them are large co-
operatives having over fifty thousand members. 
 
5.7  Voting Mechanism and Sources of Capital 
 
Figure 5-6 shows that more than eighty co-operatives have a one-member-one 
vote systems. Figure 5-7 shows that the majority of sampled co-operatives indicated 
loans from financial institutions (55.95%) are the most common source of capital for 
operations and expansion of businesses, followed by the retained earnings of members 
(42.85%). It also appears that a greater proportion of Canadian co-operatives are relying 
on debt, where as a greater proportion of U.S. co-operatives are relying on retained 
earning as their source of capital. Cobia et al (1989) argued that relying on debt as a 
source of capital might hamper a co-operative’s ability to survive, especially when the net 
income and interest rates fluctuate severely. With increased debt financing, co-operatives 
have to outlay a greater amount of revenue to pay loan interest. A greater proportion of 
both closed and open member co-operatives are relying on “retained member’s earning” 
as the main source of capital. However, the quantity of retained earnings is dependent on 
net income, which fluctuates with the business success of co-operatives. The proportions 
of closed member co-operatives relying on “required equity purchased” by members 
(18.18%) and “entry fees” (13.63%) is greater than open member co-operatives. It 
corroborates the fact that new generation co-operatives are more dependent on member’s 
up-front capital investment than are traditional marketing co-operatives. 
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5.8  Number of Competitors in Commodity and Output Market 
 
Figure 5-8 shows that co-operatives having the characteristics of NGCs are 
operating in commodity markets with fewer competitors than are traditional marketing 
co-operatives.  Figure 5-9 shows that the majority co-operatives have more than six 
competing firms in their output market. However, a greater proportion of co-operatives 
with closed membership, fixed quantity delivery contract and transferable equity stocks 
have indicated the presence of two to zero competing firms in their output market. It 
appears that co-operatives possessing NGC characteristics are operating with fewer 
competitors in both their commodity and output market.  
 
5.9  Proportion of Commodities Sold in Processed Form 
 
Figure 5-10 shows that co-operatives in the United States sold a greater 
proportion of commodities (34.0%) in processed
1 form than co-operatives in Canada 
(29.0%). Co-operatives with closed membership policy, fixed quantity of commodity 
delivery contract or transferable equity share, sold greater proportions of commodities in 
processed form than co-operatives with open membership policy, unlimited quantity 
delivery contract or without the transferable equity stocks. It corroborates the claim that 
new generation co-operatives are involved in more processing activities than are 
traditional co-operatives. 
 
5.10  Types of Differential Price Offered by Co-operatives 
 
Rather than paying the same average price to all group members, co-operatives 
pay different prices for commodities supplied by different members. The motivation 
behind differential prices is that the average contribution of members in co-operatives’ 
total revenue are not the same and the cost of providing a co-operative’s services 
(processing and marketing) are different for different members (Cobia et al 1989). There 
may be several aspects that co-operatives can use to differentiate among members, but in 
this study only the commodity quality, volume, transportation and seasonal aspects are 
considered. 
Figure 5-12 shows that the majority of co-operatives offer differential prices by 
paying a quality premium. A greater proportion of co-operatives with the characteristics 
of new generation co-operatives are offering differential prices by offering transportation 
cost premiums for commodities delivered by members. Greater proportions of co-
operatives with the characteristics of traditional marketing co-operatives are offering 
differential prices through quality premium. Competitive pressure and opportunity to 
obtain quality premiums in the output market are the main reasons for paying quality 
premiums (Question # 22, Appendix E). Depending upon the co-operatives’ needs and 
competitive pressures to buy commodities, co-operatives are paying premiums for 
delivery in a specific time period (Question # 24, Appendix E).  
 
                                                      
1 Processing can be defined as physical transformation of raw commodities (Connor et al. 1985).   37
 
5.11  Co-operative’s Output Selling Contract in Output Market  
 
Figure 5-12 shows that the majority of co-operatives sell their output through 
open market transactions. The greater proportion of co-operatives with fixed quantity 
delivery contracts and transferable equity stocks are selling their output through some 
contractual arrangements with buyers than do co-operatives with unlimited quantity 
delivery contracts and non-transferable equity stocks. These contracts include price 
contracts or volume contracts or both price and volume contracts with buyers. A greater 
proportion of closed membership co-operatives are selling their output through open 
market transactions than open membership co-operatives. This result is inconsistent with 
the results obtained for co-operatives with fixed quantity delivery contract and 
transferable equity stocks. 
 
5.12  Co-operative’s Output Buyer 
 
Figure 5-13 shows that the majority of co-operatives were selling their output to 
processors, wholesalers and final consumers. A greater proportion of US co-operatives 
are selling their output to processors while a greater proportion of Canadian co-operatives 
are selling their output to wholesalers and retailers. A greater proportion of co-operatives 
with open membership policy or unlimited quantity commodity contracts are found 
selling their output to processors. Greater proportions of co-operatives with closed 
membership policy or accepting fixed quantity of commodities are found selling output to 
retailers. 
 
5.13  Pricing and Payment Practices 
 
According to Figure 5-14, the majority of co-operatives indicated the spot market 
cash price (31%) is the most common pricing and payment practice for commodity 
supplied by members, followed by fixed forward price contract (30%) and pooled price 
(27%), respectively. A greater proportion of co-operatives in the U.S.A. indicated the 
fixed forward price contract (37 %) is their most common pricing and payment practice 
followed by the "spot market cash price" (35 %). The majority of Canadian co-operatives 
indicated pooling (58 %) is the most common pricing and payment practice. 
A greater proportion of co-operatives with open membership policy or accepting 
any quantity of commodity indicated the spot market cash price is the most common 
pricing and payment practices followed by the fixed forward price contract. A greater 
proportion of co-operatives with closed membership policy or accepting fixed quantity of 
commodity indicated that pooling is the most common pricing and payment practices 
followed by fixed forward contracts. Co-operatives with the provision of transferable 
equity stocks indicated the fixed forward price contract is the most common practice 
followed by pooling. Spot market cash price appears to be the most common pricing and 
payment practice for co-operatives with the characteristics of traditional marketing co-
operatives. Whereas pooling appear to be the most common pricing and payment practice 
for co-operatives with the characteristics of new generation co-operatives. A detailed 
percentage of the ranking of pricing and payment practices is presented in Appendix B.   38
 
5.14 Chapter Summary: 
 
From the frequency analysis of responses on various survey questions, the 
development of co-operatives with the characteristics of NGCs is a recent phenomena. 
Co-operatives possessing NGC characteristics are smaller in member size and are 
engaged in processing activities to a greater extent than co-operatives possessing 
characteristics of traditional co-operatives. Debt is the major source of capital for all co-
operatives, however co-operatives with NGC characteristics are more often relying on 
required equity purchase and entry fees than are co-operatives with the characteristics of 
traditional co-operatives. Co-operatives with NGCs characteristics are doing businesses 
in potentially less competitive market environments than co-operatives with 
characteristics of traditional co-operatives. A greater proportion of co-operatives with 
NGC characteristics are selling their output through some kind of contractual 
arrangements, such as price or volume contract or both. Pooling is the most common 
pricing and payment practice of co-operatives with NGC characteristics, where as spot 
market cash price is the most common practice of co-operatives with the characteristics 
of traditional co-operatives. 
 
The findings of this chapter are consistent with the hypotheses developed in 
Chapter 1 and theoretical analysis in Chapter 3. Co-operatives having the closed 
membership and fixed quantity delivery contract are practicing a pooling method to pay 
out member’s return. Co-operative’s might have practiced pooling to avoid the risk of 
operating deficits, while members may have participated with the expectation of higher 
returns. By paying spot market cash price, co-operatives with open membership and 
unlimited quantity delivery contract are passing on immediate benefits to their members 
in order to acquire sufficient volume of commodities. 
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Table 5-1: Number of Co-operatives Surveyed and Responses. 
Types of co-operatives  Canada U.S.A.  Total 
Total numbers of questionnaire send 
out. 
Number of questionnaire send out to 
NGCs 
 




Pure New Generation Co-operatives 
(Closed member, accept fixed quantity 
and transferable equity stocks) 
 
Pure traditional co-operatives 
(Open member, accept any quantity 





























































1 Total Response. 
2 & 
3 Percentage of questionnaire send out to NGCs and traditional co-op, respectively. 
 
 
Table 5-2: Mean Year of Operations and Member Size of Different Types of Co-operatives 
 
Variables  Years of operations  Member size 
Total sample  52.4  2494 
Canadian co-operatives  50.9  8294 
U.S. co-operatives  52.8  1311 
Open member co-operatives  61.2  3779 
Closed member co-operatives  27.4  723 
Co-operatives accepting any quantity  62.1  3439 
Co-operatives accepting fixed quantity  11.8  782 
Co-operatives with transferable equity  32.1  2444 
Co-operatives with non-transferable equity  62.1  3726 
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Figure 5-3: Reasons for Open Membership Policy (Question # 4): 
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Figure 5-6: Voting Mechanisms in Co-operatives (Question # 11): 
 
 
Figure 5-7: Most Common Sources of Capital by Different Type of Co-operatives 
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Figure 5-9: Co-operative’s Perceptions on Number of Competitor in Their Output Market 























































Figure 5-10: Average Percentage of Commodity Sold in Processed Form (Question # 15): 
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Figure 5-14: Most Common Pricing and Payment Contract Practiced by Different Co-operatives 
(Question # 20): 
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CHAPTER 6.0: ESTIMATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
This chapter has eight sections. The first section includes the results and 
discussions of the mean score analysis based on the response to various variables 
(Question # 1, Section II), which are considered important by co-operatives in choosing 
their pricing and payment alternatives. The second section includes the mean score 
analyses of co-operative’s perceptions about the effectiveness of their pricing and 
payment practices in achieving various objectives of co-operatives (Question # 2, Section 
II). The third section includes the discussion of results from the factor analyses (Question 
# 1, Section II). The fourth section includes the discussion of multinomial logit (MNL) 
analysis of variables affecting co-operatives’ choice of pricing and payment practices 
(Section I, Appendix E). Section 5 discusses the MNL model predictions of choice 
probability of pricing and payment practices for two different co-operative organizations. 
Section 6 includes discussions on the impact of increased competition on the choice 
probability of two different co-operative organizations. Section 7 includes the summary 
of the probability analysis. The final sections include the summary of chapter 6. 
 
6.1  Mean Score Comparisons of Importance of Variables Between Various Type of 
Co-operatives 
6.1.1  Background 
 
In order to investigate the differences in co-operatives’ perception about the 
importance of various variables in a co-operative’s choice of pricing and payment 
practices, mean scores are compared. Responses are elicited on a 1-5 rating scale 
(Question # 1, Section II of Appendix E), where “1” indicates a variable under 
consideration is “unimportant” and “5” indicates it is “very important” in a co-operatives’ 
decision to choose a pricing and payment alternative. Mean scores and standard deviation 
of these variables for the total sample are given in Table 6-1. Mean scores for all 
variables are greater than 3.0, generally co-operatives considered all nine variables 
important in their choice of pricing and payment alternatives.  
New Generation Co-operatives (NGCs) differ from traditional co-operatives in 
membership structure, commodity delivery contract and tradable equity stocks. From the 
survey of co-ops, these features are not exclusively confined to NGCs and the number of 
NGCs consisting of all three characteristics is very few. Comparison of mean scores for 
each variable is done on co-operatives of Canada vs. U.S.A.; co-operatives with open vs. 
closed membership, fixed quantity vs. unlimited quantity commodity delivery contracts, 
and transferable vs. nontransferable equity stocks. 
6.1.2  Results and Discussions 
 
Tables 6-2 shows the results of mean comparison between co-operatives of 
Canada or USA origin. None of the variables under consideration are significantly 
different between co-operatives of Canada and the U.S.A. Co-operatives from both 
countries provided similar responses when evaluating their pricing and payment 
practices.   51
The hypothesis of equality of variance is not rejected for all variables, therefore 
pooled t-statistics (Equation 4-1) are used to compare the means of closed and open 
member co-operatives. The hypothesis of equal mean between closed and open member 
co-operative (Table 6-3) is rejected on questions about encouraging members to deliver 
to co-operatives, reducing member’s uncertainty of return and treating all members 
equally. Open member co-operatives place significantly greater importance on 
encouraging members to deliver to their co-operatives. Closed member co-operatives on 
the other hand, emphasize more the need to reduce member’s uncertainty of return and 
treating all members equally. These results are explained below. 
In open membership co-operatives, members are not obliged to deliver 
commodity to their co-operatives. In order to acquire sufficient volumes of commodity, 
open member co-operatives may give more importance on encouraging members to 
deliver to co-operatives. Open member co-operatives may want to pass on immediate 
benefits to members in order to attract the more commodity. By paying the spot market 
cash price, open member co-operatives can attract more commodities. Since membership 
is open, open member co-operatives set price equal to average net revenue (ANR). 
Due to binding contracts with members and significant equity capital 
contributions by members, closed member co-operatives may place greater importance 
on reducing member’s uncertainty of return and treating all members equally. Open 
member co-operatives in U.S.A. place greater importance on the presence of competitors 
in their output market and encouraging members to deliver to co-operatives (Table 6-4). 
Closed member co-operatives in Canada place greater importance on reducing operating 
deficits of co-operatives and treating all members equally. 
Equality of variance hypothesis is rejected for only the variable matching the 
rival’s pricing and payment policy, so t-statistics from separate variance assumptions 
(Equation 4-2 ) is used to compare the mean of that variable. Table 6-5 shows that the 
variables matching the rival’s pricing and payment practices, and encouraging members 
to deliver to their co-operatives, are significantly different between co-operatives with 
fixed quantity and unlimited quantity delivery contract. Co-operatives with unlimited 
quantity delivery contracts place greater importance on matching rival’s pricing and 
payment practices, and encouraging members to deliver to their co-operatives. U.S. co-
operatives with unlimited commodity delivery also place greater importance on the 
presence of competitors in their output market than co-operatives with fixed quantity 
delivery contracts (Table 6-6). As discussed in Chapter 5, co-operatives accepting fixed 
quantities of a commodity might have already arranged the total quantity of commodity 
needed to match their handling, marketing and processing capacities. These co-operatives 
do not need to match rival’s pricing policy to encourage members to deliver commodities 
in the short run. Canadian co-operatives with unlimited quantity delivery place greater 
importance on member’s cash flow needs and equal treatment of members than do co-
operatives with fixed quantity delivery contracts. 
Table 6-7 shows that only the variable, encouraging members to deliver to their 
co-operative is significantly different between co-operatives with and without the 
provision of transferable equity stocks. Co-operatives with non-transferable equity stocks 
place greater importance to encouraging members to deliver to their co-operatives than 
do co-operatives with transferable equity stocks. As discussed in Chapter 2, co-operatives 
with non-transferable equity stocks faces two problems, viz. horizon and portfolio   52
problems. These two problems create disincentives for members to invest in their co-
operatives, force the management to increase the share of cash payment relative to 
member’s investment and expedite the equity redemption plan. In order to keep business 
and maintain the capital positions of co-operatives through increased earnings, co-
operatives with non-transferable equity stocks generally give more consideration to 
encouraging members to deliver to their co-operative. In the case of co-operatives with 
the provision of transferable equity, co-operatives do not need to worry about revolving 
equity back to members since members themselves can sell their right to deliver 
commodities if they are not satisfied with their co-operative. 
6.1.3  Conclusions of Mean Score Analysis 
 
From the analysis of mean score comparison, co-operatives with the 
characteristics of traditional marketing co-operatives place greater importance on 
matching the competitors’ pricing and payment policy, meeting competition in output 
markets and encouraging members to deliver to their co-operatives. This result is 
consistent with the third hypothesis in Chapter 1. According to the third hypothesis, 
traditional marketing co-operatives are more responsive to competitive levels in 
commodity markets. Co-operatives with characteristics of NGCs give more importance to 
reducing the risk of operating deficits, member’s uncertainty of return and treating all 
members equally. These results could not substantiate the first hypothesis. According to 
the first hypothesis, NGCs are more likely to choose such pricing and payment 
alternatives which reduces the risk of operating deficits of co-operatives. Table 6.3 shows 
the closed member co-operatives give more importance on reducing the operating 
deficits, but Table 6-5 and 6-7 shows that co-operatives with unlimited quantity delivery 
contract and non-transferable equity stocks give more importance to reducing operating 
deficits than do co-operatives with fixed quantity delivery and transferable equity stocks. 
These results tend to reject hypothesis one. 
The second hypothesis that traditional marketing co-operatives choose pricing and 
payment practices which minimize member’s uncertainty of return, could not be 
supported from the mean score analysis. Table 6-3 shows that closed member co-
operatives place significantly greater importance on reducing member’s uncertainty of 
return. Table 6-5 and 6-7 show that co-operatives with closed membership and with 
transferable equity stock place equal importance on reducing members’ uncertainty of 
return. These results tend to lead to rejection of hypothesis two. 
 
6.2  Mean Score Analysis of Co-operative’s Perceived Successes of Pricing and 
Payment Practices 
 
Mean scores are compared between different types of co-operatives to investigate 
the differences in perceived effectiveness of current pricing and payment practices used 
by each co-operative. Responses on effectiveness of current pricing and payment policies 
on achieving various goals are used for mean score analysis. These responses were 
elicited using a 1-5 scale (Question # 2, Section II of Appendix E), where “1” indicates 
“very unsuccessful” and “5” indicates “very successful”.   53
Table 6-8 shows the sample mean and standard deviation of scores for the five 
variables under consideration. Based upon the mean scores, co-operatives in general 
perceived that their pricing and payment policies are successful in achieving the five 
goals. 
Table 6-9 shows that none of the variables under consideration are significantly 
different between co-operatives in Canada and the USA. Similar kinds of perceptions 
about the effectiveness of pricing and payment policies are found for respondents of both 
Canadian and US co-operatives. 
Table 6-10 shows that there is significant difference in perceptions about 
perceived success of pricing and payment practices between co-operatives accepting 
fixed quantity and unlimited quantity of commodities at maintaining the desired volume 
and at attracting the required quality of commodity. Co-operatives with fixed quantity 
delivery contracts believe they are more successful in acquiring the desired volume and 
quality of commodity than co-operatives with unlimited quantity delivery contracts. This 
result is consistent with the perception that in new generation co-operatives, there is often 
a two-way contract between member and co-operatives. Members must deliver the fixed 
quantity of commodity of specified quality stipulated in the contract terms and the co-
operatives must accept the quantity and quality of commodities specified in the contract 
terms. 
Table 6-10 shows that none of the variables under considerations are significantly 
different between open and closed member co-operatives. It seems that both types of co-
operatives perceive similar kind of successes in their pricing and payment practices in 
achieving their various objectives. 
Cross tabulation analysis was done between the pricing and payment alternatives 
ranked as number “one” and co-operatives’ perceptions about effectiveness of their 
pricing and payment policies in achieving five goals (Question # 2, Section II). However, 
no clear relationships was found and the degree of association is very weak. Therefore, 
the results of cross tabulation analysis are not presented and discussed. 
From the above mean score analysis, pricing and payment practices of co-
operatives having characteristics of NGCs are more successful in acquiring required 
volume and quality of commodities than pricing and payment practice of co-operatives 
having characteristics of traditional marketing co-operatives. 
 
6.3  Factor Analysis of Importance of Various Variables in Co-operative’s Choice of 
Pricing and Payment Practices 
6.3.1  Background 
 
In this section, results of "common factor" analysis are discussed. Common factor 
analysis was done on responses elicited from question i to ix of Section II of the 
questionnaire (Appendix E). These responses are elicited on a 1-5 rating scale, in which 
“1” and “5” indicates variables are “Not Important at All” and “Very Important” 
respectively when co-operatives are choosing a particular pricing and payment practice. 
The responses are related to various factors; viz.; commodity and output market 
environment, financial management of co-operatives, members’ welfare, co-operatives’ 
goal and philosophy. Common factor analysis is done on the covariance matrix by using   54
the principal component method of factor extraction, and the varimax method is used for 
the factor rotation. Discussion and analysis of results follow.  
6.3.2  Results and Discussions: 
 
Factor loadings were estimated using both principal component analysis and 
common factor analysis. The extracted factors only explained 58.3 % of total variance in 
case of principal component analysis, where as 67.9% of variance is explained by 
extracted factors in common factor analysis. As a rule in factor analysis, extracted factors 
should explain as much variance as possible. Extracted factors from common factor 
analysis explained more variance than factors extracted by principal component analysis. 
Only the results on factor loadings and communality estimated from common factor 
analysis are presented and discussed in this section. Using the eigen-value criteria, four 
factors are retained. The rotated factor loading matrices from cofactor analyses are given 
in Table 6-11. 
Factor 1 has the highest loading with the variables: co-operative’s need to reduce 
the member’s uncertainty of returns, maintaining target rate of return and risks of 
avoiding co-operative's operating deficit. More than 69% of the variance on these three 
factors are explained by the four factors. Thus factor “1” can be considered a risk-return 
factor for members and co-operatives.  
Market environment variables, viz.; matching the rival’s pricing and payment 
practices, and presence of competitors in co-operative’s output market have higher 
loading with factor “2” with each variable having more than 68% communality. Factor 2 
can be considered as market environment factor.  
Co-operative’s need to address cash flow needs of member producers and 
encouraging members to deliver into co-operatives have higher loading with factor 3, 
with a communality of more than 72% and 87% respectively. So factor "3" can be 
viewed as member incentive variable. Similarly, managing working capital and equal 
treatment of members have higher loading on factor 4. Factor 4 can be considered as the 
working capital management factor. The importance of equal treatment of members 
explains only 36.4% of communality, which means all the extracted four factors can only 
explain 36.4% of variability in that variable. There must be other factors which are 
unique to that variable and not explored by the survey questions of this study.  
Different groupings of factors are observed when separate factor analysis is done 
on responses from different types of co-operatives, such as closed (Table 6-13) and open 
member co-operatives (Table 6-12), co-operatives with fixed (Table 6-15) and 
unrestricted commodity delivery (Table 6-14) contract, and transferable (Table 6-16) and 
non-transferable equity stocks (Table 6-17). Co-operatives with characteristics of NGCs 
and traditional co-operatives use different criteria to evaluate the importance of various 
variables. However, the groupings of variables on factors are not consistent with prior 
expectations. Variables, matching rivals’ pricing and payment policy, and presence of 
competitor in the output markets are not grouped together. Both of these variables have 
lower factor loading for co-operatives with unlimited quantity delivery and non-
transferable equity, which is contrary to the expectation. Much variation in groupings of 
variable is observed especially in traditional co-operatives. However, there is more or less 
consistent grouping of variables in co-operatives with closed membership, fixed quantity   55
delivery and transferable equity shares. These variations made summarization of 
variables difficult. These variations might be due to the small sample size. So the results 
of separate factor analyses on different attributes of co-operatives are not discussed in 
detail.  
6.3.3  Summary of factor analyses: 
 
  Results of factor analyses do not explicitly support the hypotheses developed in 
chapter 1. Results of common factor analysis indicated that co-operative’s decision to 
choose a pricing and payment practice for commodity delivered by members can be 
summarized by four factors. These factors are: risk and return of co-operatives and 
members, market environment, member incentives and capital management variable. In 
other words, co-operative considers risk and return of members and co-operatives, market 
environment in its commodity and output market, members’ incentive and management 
of working capital as important factors. Variance explained by the extracted factors is not 
overly high when compared with other factor analysis studies, as in Kim et al. (1997). 
Members’ know how and co-operative manager’s familiarity with operation of different 
types of pricing and payment practices are crucial for success of a pricing and payment 
practices, and convincing members to participate. Therefore, members’ education and 
managers’ know how, questions missing in this study, could be included in future studies. 
 
6.4  Multinomial Logit Analysis for Choice of Pricing and Payment Practices by Co-
operatives  
6.4.1  Model Development for Multinomial Logit Estimation 
 
Ranked responses on seven pricing and payment alternatives were elicited from 
the co-operatives. These alternatives are: spot market cash price, pool price, fixed 
forward price, guaranteed minimum price, basis contract, hedge-to-arrive contract and 
others (Question # 20, Appendix E). These multiple alternatives of pricing and payment 
practices for co-operatives are the dependent variables for the multinomial logit analysis.  
Four multinomial logit models were estimated. Models 1 and 2 were estimated by using 
expression 4-8. In models 1 and 2, only the pricing and payment alternatives ranked as 
number “1” are included as dependent variable. Alternatives ranked other than number 
“1” are labeled as “0”. Ranked responses on alternatives “hedge-to-arrive contract”, 
“basis contract” and “guaranteed minimum price contract” as number “1” were very few 
or none. Singularity of matrix is observed when these alternatives are included in the 
model. Therefore, responses on these three alternatives are merged into “others” 
category. Along with demographic variables, factor scores extracted from factor analysis 
were also included as explanatory variables in model 2, where as only the demographic 
variables are included in model 1 (Table 6-19). A list of independent variables, 
definitions and labels of variables are given in Table 6-18. 
Models 3 and 4 were estimated by using expression 4-11. In models 3 and 4, full 
rank responses on pricing and payment alternatives are included as dependent variables. 
As in models 1 and 2, when responses on all seven alternatives are included as dependent 
variables, singularity of matrix is observed. Ranked responses on alternatives “Basis   56
Contract” and “Hedge-to-arrive contract” were deleted and the new ranks were assigned 
to remaining alternatives based upon the rank order of original response. As such, ranked 
responses on five alternatives, viz. spot market cash price, pool price, fixed forward price, 
guaranteed minimum price and others, became the dependent variables for models 3 and 
4. Model 4 includes the factor scores extracted from factor analysis along with other 
demographic variables, where as model 3 includes only demographic variables as 
explanatory variables (Table 6-19). Factor scores were included in model 2 and 4, to 
investigate whether the importance of these factors are statistically valid or not. The 
estimation of the multinomial logit model requires the normalization of one of the 
parameter sets in order to identify the parameters of the model. In this study, the 
regression coefficients for alternative “others” were normalized and chosen as the base. 
 
6.4.2  Model Estimation and Results 
 
Four multi-nominal logit models were estimated using LIMDEP, Version 7.0 
(Greene 1995). Using equation 4-8, Models 1 and 2 predicts the co-operative’s choice of 
the most common pricing and payment practices based on the various demographic 
characteristics of co-operatives and variables related to degree of competition in 
commodity market. Models 3 and 4 predict co-operative’s ranking of pricing and 
payment practices.  
The results from the log-likelihood
2 ratio test indicate that the estimated model 
"1" and model "2" are statistically valid. The value of pseudo R-square
3 are 0.204 and 
0.259 for models 1 and 2, respectively. These values of pseudo R-square indicate the 
acceptable goodness of fit. Due to the nature of the data and amount of grouping that was 
done to the data, the test of independent of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) is not conducted 
for non-ranked models 1 & 2. Models were also estimated by including COUNTRY 
variable as a regressor. The impact of COUNTRY variable was not significant and had 
little effect on the coefficient estimates of other independent variables. Therefore, results 
of these models are not discussed. Models were also estimated by including independent 
variables on whether the commodities purchased by co-operatives from members have a 
futures market or not. It is hypothesized that traditional co-operatives are operating in 
primary commodities business such as wheat, corn etc., where as NGCs are doing 
business on niche markets, such as bison meat, ethanol etc. Therefore, it is assumed that 
futures markets exist for commodities purchased by traditional co-operatives and does 
not exist for commodities purchased by NGCs. No clear results were obtained from MNL 
estimation on the relationship of futures markets and choice of pricing and payment 
alternatives. Therefore, results of MNL models including futures market variables are not 
presented and discussed. 
The results of the multinomial logit model "1" (Table 6-20) shows that 
membership policy has a statistically significant impact on the choice of pooling 
practices. Types of commodity delivery contract have a significant effect on the choice of 
the spot market cash price and fixed forward price. Similarly the transferable equity 
                                                      
2 Log-Likelihood Ratio=-2[Log-L unrestricted model – Log-L restricted model] 
3 Pseudo R
2 = 1-[LnL(β ) / LnL(No coefficients)]   57
stocks and number of competitors have a significant impact on the choice of fixed 
forward price and spot market cash price respectively. 
The results of the multinomial logit model "2" (Table 6-21) shows membership 
policy is statistically significantly associated with the choice of the spot market cash 
price. As in model “1”, commodity delivery contract is associated with the choice of spot 
market cash price and fixed forward price contract. The market environment variable is 
associated with the choice of spot market and pooling practices. Results from models 1 
and 2 corroborate the fact that the type of co-operative organizations and market 
environment affects the choice of pricing and payment practices.  
The results from the log-likelihood ratio test indicate that the estimated model "3" 
and model "4" are statistically valid. The value for pseudo R-squares for Models 3 & 4 
are 0.24 and 0.38 respectively. These pseudo R-square values indicate an acceptable 
goodness of fit. 
The results of ranked logit models 3 (Table 6-22) and 4 (Table 6-23) show 
membership variable is highly significant to the spot market cash price, fixed forward 
price contract and pooled price. Commodity delivery contract variable is significantly 
associated with fixed forward price and guaranteed minimum price. The variable 
transferable equity share is significantly associated with the fixed forward price contract. 
The number of competitors in the commodity market has a significant impact on the 
choice of pooling and guaranteed minimum price. With increased importance of risk and 
return, co-operatives either have to pay spot market cash price at the commodity delivery 
time or guarantee a minimum price to members.  
When we compare models 1 and 3, variables membership policy, commodity 
delivery contract, transferable equity stocks and number of competitors are significant in 
both models. However, significant associations of these variables with choice alternatives 
are different. The proportions of commodity processed variable is not significant in 
model 1 but is significant in model 3. The sign on the coefficients of variables remained 
the same in both models. Similar results are observed when models 2 and 4 are 
compared. Coefficients estimated from the four models show that the distinguishing 
characteristics of NGCs and traditional co-operatives such as type of membership policy, 
commodity delivery contract and transferable equity stocks have a statistically significant 
impact on a co-operative’s choice of pricing and payment practices. Similarly, the level 
of competition in the commodity market also has a significant impact on a co-operative’s 
choice. These results implicitly support the hypotheses proposed for this study, although 
it is premature to explain the direction of support based upon the sign of the coefficient 
estimates. As mentioned in the methodology sections of Chapter 4, the coefficient 
estimates from probability models are not always straightforward to interpret. So further 
interpretations and analyses are based on predicted and marginal probabilities. 
 
6.4.2.1  Predicted Probabilities and Marginal Probabilities For Representative Co-
operative: Model 1 (non-ranked model) 
 
Estimation of marginal probability of variables measured by factor scores is 
difficult to interpret. Models 1,2,3 & 4 provided similar qualitative results. Therefore, 
total and marginal probabilities were estimated by using the coefficients of models 1 and 
3. Marginal probabilities of each variable are estimated for two scenarios. The first   58
scenario is when the profile of a “representative traditional co-operatives” is retained as 
the base case, and the other is when the profile of a “representative new generation co-
operatives” is retained as the base case. The “representative co-operative” represents the 
characteristics of the majority of NGCs and traditional co-operatives from the survey 
sample. Base case profiles for traditional co-operatives and NGCs, and changes in these 
levels are given it Tables 6-24 and 6-26 respectively. 
Table 6-25 shows the predicted probability of the representative traditional co-
operative (base case scenario) choosing the spot market cash price as the most common 
pricing and payment practices is 0.5182, 0.1972 for pooling, 0.2351 for fixed forward 
price contract and 0.0493 for other practices.  If a co-operative shifts its’ policy of open 
membership to closed membership, keeping all other variables at base case level (Table 
6-24), the choice probability of “spot market cash price” decreased by -0.4216 whereas 
the choice probability of the “pooling” increased by +0.5221.  Similarly, if a co-operative 
shifts its policy of accepting unlimited quantity to fixed quantity of commodity from 
members then the choice probability of “spot market cash price” is decreased by -0.4101, 
where as the choice probability of “others” increased by +0.5449. When sign coefficients 
estimated in model 1(Table 6-20) are compared with the estimated marginal probability 
(Table 6-25), the directions of change in probability are same in both estimates. The 
membership variable has a negative sign with pooling alternatives (Table 6-20), which 
implies open membership co-operatives are less likely to choose pooling alternatives. 
When the open membership is changed to closed membership, the direction of change in 
choice probability of pooling has the expected positive sign. Similarly, commodity 
delivery contract variable has significant negative sign coefficients with spot market cash 
price and fixed forward price contract. When a traditional co-operative changes its’ 
policy of accepting any quantity to fixed quantity the direction of change in choice 
probability of spot market cash price and fixed forward price have negative signs (Table 
6-25). The sign on estimated coefficient parameters and predicted marginal probabilities 
are the same for the base case.  
These results are consistent with the assumption that pooling is the popular 
pricing and payment practices in new generation co-operatives (Fulton 1997). In NGCs, 
the number of members and quantity of commodity to be delivered by each member are 
restricted according to the needs of the co-operative business. Therefore, NGCs do not 
need to attract any new members by matching competitor’s price by offering spot market 
cash price.  
If the co-operative shifts its policy of non-transferable equity stocks to 
transferable equity stocks the choice probability of all pricing and payment alternatives 
are decreased except the fixed forward price contract (Table 6-25). In MNL model 1 
(Table 6-20), the coefficient on transferability of equity is statistically significant with the 
alternative fixed forward price contract. With the transferability of equity stocks, 
members can adjust their asset portfolio to match their personal risk preferences.. 
If one additional firm enters in the commodity market of the co-operative then the 
probability of choosing all the alternatives except the “spot market cash price” is 
decreased. The probability of choosing the spot market cash price is increased by 
+0.0217 (Table 6-25). This result is consistent with the assumption that with an increased 
number of firms in a market, the competition for the producer’s commodity is increased.   59
In order to acquire sufficient volumes of commodity for efficient operation, co-operatives 
may have to match the pricing and payment alternatives offered by rival firms.  
Marginal probabilities are also estimated by using a base case profile of NGCs 
(Table 6-26). The estimated results are presented in Table 6-27. In order to estimate the 
marginal probabilities, the level variables are changed from closed to open member, fixed 
to any quantity and transferable to non-transferable equity stocks. It was expected that the 
direction of change in choice probability of a particular pricing and payment policy due 
to change in level of these variables, would be the opposite from the marginal probability 
estimated from the base profile for traditional co-operatives. Table 6-27 shows the 
direction of change in predicted probability due to changes in membership, commodity 
delivery contract or transferable equity stocks are as expected. Changes in choice 
probability due to change in proportion of commodity processed and number of rival 
firms are as expected and consistent with the marginal probabilities estimated from the 
base profile of traditional co-operatives. Therefore, those results are not discussed further. 
Marginal and predicted probabilities for the ranked logit model 3 were estimated 
but are not reported. According to the expression 4-11 (Chapter 4), we can estimate the 
probability for a particular order of ranking of choice alternatives, as well as the 
probability of choosing one alternative. There could be numerous combinations of ranked 
order of alternatives. The probability of a particular ranked logit model is very small if all 
the ranks are included. The marginal analysis from the ranked model 3, when using the 
model to choose only one alternative provides similar results as found with model 1. The 
estimated marginal probability for model 3 are given in appendix C and are not discussed 
further. 
 
6.5  Predictions of Choice of Pricing and Payment Practices by Traditional and New 
Generation Co-operatives 
6.5.1  Background  
 
The New Generation Co-operative’s (NGCs) are different from traditional 
marketing co-operatives in membership policy, commodity delivery contract, provision 
of tradable and transferable equity shares and level of processing activities. NGCs often 
have a closed membership policy, and accept fixed quantities of commodity from each 
member. Equity shares in NGCs can be transferred to any qualified member and the level 
of processing activities is higher in NGCs who responded to this survey. Traditional 
marketing co-operatives conversely often have open membership policies, accept any 
quantity of commodity, do not have a provision of transferable and tradable equity shares 
and are engaged in little or no value-added processing activities. This section seeks to 
identify what kind of pricing and payment options producers are likely to be offered if 
they join traditional marketing co-operatives or new generation co-operatives. 
Predicted probabilities of choosing different alternatives for traditional marketing 
and new generation co-operatives are estimated when each type of co-operative has all 
their set of distinguishing characteristics. The whole set of features which are considered 
different between NGCs and traditional marketing co-operatives are changed (Table 6-
28). 
   60
6.5.2  Result and Discussions 
 
The estimated choice probabilities for NGCs and traditional marketing co-
operatives by using coefficient estimates of Model 1 are presented in Table 6-29. When 
producers deliver their commodities to traditional co-operatives, they are more likely to 
be offered the “spot market cash price” by co-operatives. The producers are more likely 
to be offered “pooled price” when producers shift their commodity delivery from 
traditional marketing co-operatives to new generation co-operatives,  
This result does not reject the first and second hypothesis developed in Chapter 1. 
Although we do not verify with statistical tests, the probabilities are different. However, 
coefficients of some of the variables used in predicting choice probabilities are 
statistically significant (Table 6-20). The first hypothesis that new generation co-
operatives choose pooling practices cannot be rejected. This result is also consistent with 
Fulton’s (1997) claim that pooling has been a distinct pricing and payment practice in 
NGCs. Most NGCs are engaged in value-added processing ventures and final returns will 
only be realized after disposal of the final output. By paying a pooled price, new 
generation co-operatives can avoid an operating deficit and reduce pressure on their 
working capital. We also cannot reject the hypothesis that traditional co-operatives 
choose the spot market cash price. Due to an open membership policy, members are not 
obliged to deliver their commodities to co-operatives, so traditional co-operatives may 
have to offer immediate returns which eliminates the member’s uncertainty of final 
returns. 
Predicted probabilities estimated from ranked model 3, when each type of co-
operative has all their set of distinguishing characteristics gives similar results (Appendix 
D) as found with model 1. Therefore, results of predicted probabilities estimated from 
ranked model 3 are not discussed further. 
 
6.6  Predicted Impact of Increased Competition on Choice Probability of Pricing 
and Payment Alternatives. 
 
This section analyzes the impact of increased competition in the commodity 
market on the choice probability of pricing and payment practices of traditional 
marketing and new generation co-operatives. Choice probabilities for both NGCs and 
traditional marketing co-operatives were estimated when they faced six (6) competitor 
and when they faced seven (7) competitor firms in their commodity market, keeping all 
other variables constant. These predicted probabilities were compared to probabilities 
estimated from the base case scenario presented in Table 6-28. 
Table 6-30 shows that with the entry of one more firm into the co-operative’s 
commodity market, the choice probability of the spot market cash price increases the 
most for traditional marketing co-operatives. The choice probability of pooling increases 
the most for NGCs. In the case of traditional marketing co-operatives, with the provision 
of an open membership policy and accepting any quantity of commodity, members can 
deliver their commodities to anyone who offers better terms. With the increased number 
of commodity buyers, the co-operative may have to bid to match offers made by rival 
firms in order to acquire sufficient volumes of commodity. Although changes in 
probabilities were not tested statistically, the third hypothesis can not be rejected.    61
 
6.7  Summary of Probability Analysis 
 
New generation co-operatives are more likely to offer pooled price contracts for 
commodities supplied by members where as traditional marketing co-operatives are more 
likely to offer spot market cash prices. Traditional marketing co-operatives are more 
responsive to increased competition in commodity markets than new generation co-
operatives.  
From the analysis of the multinomial logit models, traditional marketing co-
operatives are more responsive to members’ needs and the competitive environment. By 
paying the spot market cash price, traditional marketing co-operatives have addressed the 
members’ cash flow needs and risk of uncertain returns. Because members are 
hypothesized to have  strong time preferences for cash, they may want to avoid the risk of 
uncertain returns. However, by paying spot market cash prices traditional co-operatives 
may incur a risk of operating deficit due to output price risk and they may also need to 
outlay more working capital. These facts may act as a disincentive for traditional co-
operatives to engage in further processing activities. 
  
6.8  Chapter Summary 
 
From the mean score analysis, the third hypothesis that traditional co-operatives 
are more responsive to competitive level is not rejected. However, the first and second 
hypothesis can not be rejected from mean score analysis. From the analysis of mean score 
comparison, co-operatives with characteristics of traditional co-operatives are giving 
greater importance on matching the rivals’ pricing and payment policies, meeting the 
competition in the output market, and encouraging members to deliver to their co-
operative. Co-operatives with the characteristics of NGCs are found to place greater 
importance on reducing members’ uncertainty of return and treating all members equally.  
Results of factor analysis shows that the co-operatives’ decision to choose pricing 
and payment practices for commodities supplied by members can be explained by four 
important factors. These are: perceptions of risk and return by co-operatives and 
members, market environment in commodity and output market, need to address 
incentive for members and management of working capital. Traditional and new 
generation co-operatives used different criteria to evaluate the importance of various 
variables.  
From the coefficient estimates of non-ranked models 1 and 2, and ranked models 
3 and 4, open member co-operatives are less likely to choose pooling practices but are 
likely to choose spot market cash price and fixed forward price contract. Co-operatives 
with fixed quantity delivery contract are less likely to choose spot market cash price. 
Therefore, statistically we cannot reject the second hypothesis that traditional co-
operatives are more likely to choose spot market cash price. However, we do not have 
statistical ground to either reject or not reject the first hypothesis that new generation co-
operatives are more likely to choose pooling practices. Coefficients for variables fixed 
commodity delivery contract and transferable delivery rights are not significantly 
associated with pooling alternative. Results from models 1 and 3 show that with an 
increased number of competitors, traditional co-operatives increase their probability of   62
choosing spot market cash price. We did not directly statistically test the third hypotheses 
that traditional co-operatives are more responsive to changing levels of competition.  
Probability analysis of multinomial logit shows that traditional co-operatives are 
more likely to offer spot market cash prices and they are also more responsive to 
changing competition in the commodity market than new generation co-operatives. New 
generation co-operatives are more likely to offer pooled price for commodities supplied 
by members. Therefore, from the probability analysis we can not reject all three 
hypotheses developed in Chapter 1.   63




1 (N=83)  Standard Deviation 
Matching the rivals’ pricing and payment practices 
Managing work co-operatives’ working capital 
Presence of competitor in output market 
Encouraging members to deliver to their co-op 
Members’ cash flow management 
Avoiding co-operatives’ risk of operating deficit 
Reducing members’ uncertainty of return 
Maintaining target rate of return 























Table 6-2: Results of Mean Score comparison of U.S. and Canadian Co-operatives. 
Mean scores
1  Variables 
Canada (N=18)  U.S.A.(N=65) 
P-value(2-tailed) 
Matching rival’s pricing and payment policy 
 
Managing working capital 
 
Presence of competitor in output market 
 
Encouraging members to deliver 
 
Cash flow management of the member 
 
Reducing the risk of operating deficit 
 
Reducing the member’s uncertainty of return 
 
Maintaining the target rate of return 
 
Treating the all members equally 
3.66                            3.769                 0.732 
 
3.44                            3.538                 0.769 
 
3.722                          3.692                 0.915 
 
3.352                          3.400                 0.895 
 
3.117                          3.000                 0.708 
 
3.914                          3.553                 0.852 
 
3.352                          3.076                 0.456 
 
3.647                          3.553                 0.762 
 
4.117                          4.276                 0.643 
N= Number of response for each country. 
1 Mean scores measured in 1-5 scale. 1 indicates variable is “Not Important at All” and 5 indicates “Very 
Important”. 
   64
 
Table 6-3: Results of Mean Score Comparison of Closed and O pen Membership Co-operatives 
Mean score







Matching rival’s pricing and payment policy 
Managing working capital 
Presence of competitor in output market 
Encouraging members to deliver 
Cash flow management of the member 
Reducing the risk of operating deficit 
Reducing the member’s uncertainty of return 
Maintaining the target rate of return 
Treating the all members equally 
3.428                       3.854                        0.189 
3.571                       3.500                        0.814 
3.285                       3.838                        0.084 
2.761                       3.606                        0.029* 
3.047                       3.016                        0.915 
4.333                       3.868                        0.111 
3.666                       2.950                        0.008** 
3.761                       3.508                        0.375 
4.857                       4.032                        0.000** 
* Mean score are significantly different at 95% confidence level. 
** Mean score are significantly different at 99% confidence level. 
1 Mean scores measured in 1-5 scale. 1 indicates variable is “Not Important at All” and 5 indicates “Very 
Important”. 
 
Table 6-4: Results of Mean Score Comparisons between Closed and Open Member Co-operatives 














Matching rival’s pricing and payment policy 
Managing working capital 
Presence of competitor in output market 
Encouraging members to deliver 
Cash flow management of the member 
Reducing the risk of operating deficit 
Reducing the member’s uncertainty of return 
Maintaining the target rate of return 
Treating the all members equally 
3.66         3.90           0.712        3.33         3.90         0.131 
3.50         3.63           0.841        3.60        3.52         0.815 
3.83         3.90          0.898        3.06         3.88         0.044* 
3.66         3.18          0.508        2.40         3.70       0.008** 
3.16         3.09          0.917        3.00         3.00          1.00 
4.66         3.54          0.038*      4.20         3.94          0.456 
4.16         2.90          0.078        3.46         2.96          0.077 
4.33         3.27          0.058         3.53        3.56          0.937 
4.83         3.72          0.039*       4.60        4.10          0.082 
* Mean score are significantly different at 95% confidence level. 
** Mean score are significantly different at 99% confidence level. 
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Table 6-5: Results of Mean Score Comparison of Co-operative Accepting Unlimited and Fixed 
Quantity of Commodities. 
Mean scores







Matching rival’s pricing and payment policy 
Managing working capital 
Presence of competitor in output market 
Encouraging members to deliver 
Cash flow management of the member 
Reducing the risk of operating deficit 
Reducing the member’s uncertainty of return 
Maintaining the target rate of return 
Treating the all members equally 
3.937                                  3.105                      0.018* 
3.531                                  3.473                      0.855 
3.843                                  3.210                       0.075 
3.714                                  2.315                       0.001** 
3.095                                  2.789                       0.310 
4.142                                  3.473                       0.075 
3.190                                  2.947                       0.391 
3.682                                  3.210                       0.109 
4.238                                  4.263                       0.924 
* Mean score are significantly different at 95% confidence level. 
** Mean score are significantly different at 99% confidence level. 
1 Mean scores measured in 1-5 scale. 1 indicates variable is “Not Important at All” and 5 indicates “Very 
Important”.  
 
Table 6-6: Results of Mean Score Comparison of Co-operatives Accepting Unlimited and Fixed 





















Matching rival’s pricing and payment 
policy 
Managing working capital 
Presence of competitor in output market 
Encouraging members to deliver 
Cash flow management of the member 
Reducing the risk of operating deficit 
Reducing the member’s uncertainty of 
return 
Maintaining the target rate of return 
Treating the all members equally 
3.20              4.08          0.188       3.07          3.96            0.036* 
 
3.20              3.75          0.436       3.57          3.52              0.905 
3.40              4.08          0.261       3.14          3.84             0.094 
2.40              3.75          0.061       2.28          3.70          0.005** 
2.00              3.58          0.024*     3.07          2.98             0.784 
3.20              4.25          0.068       3.57          4.11             0.232 
2.80              3.58          0.312       3.00          3.09             0.807 
 
3.20             3.83           0.301        3.21          3.61             0.208 
2.60             4.75           0.020*      4.57          4.11             0.171 
* Mean score are significantly different at 95% confidence level. 
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Table 6-7: Results of Mean Score Comparisons of Co-operatives with Transferable and Non-
Transferable equity stocks. 
 







Matching rival’s pricing and payment policy 
Managing working capital 
Presence of competitor in output market 
Encouraging members to deliver 
Cash flow management of the member 
Reducing the risk of operating deficit 
Reducing the member’s uncertainty of return 
Maintaining the target rate of return 
Treating the all members equally 
3.872                           3.481                            0.191 
3.527                           3.481                            0.872 
3.781                           3.518                            0.289 
3.777                           2.592                            0.001** 
3.074                           2.925                            0.588 
4.055                           3.814                            0.378 
3.092                           3.185                            0.718 
3.629                           3.444                            0.490 
4.129                           4.481                            0.134 
** Mean score are significantly different at 99% confidence level. 
1 Mean scores measured in 1-5 scale. 1 indicates variable is “Not Important at All” and 5 indicates “Very 
Important”. 
 
Table 6-8: Mean and Standard Deviation of Variables Related to Effectiveness of Co-operatives’ 





Maintaining members’ commitment 
Providing higher returns to the member 
Meeting the competitor’s price for commodities 
Maintaining the desired volume of commodities 
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Table 6-9: Results of Mean Score Comparison of Effectiveness of Pricing and Payment Practices 
between Canadian and the US co-operatives 
Mean score
1  Variables 
Canada (N=18)  U.S.A. (N=65) 
P-value(2-
tailed) 
Maintaining member’s commitment 
Providing higher returns to the member 
Meeting the competitor’s prices for commodities 
Maintaining the desired volume of commodities 
Attracting the required quality of raw product 
4.0                                    3.85                         0.470 
3.52                                  3.80                         0.186 
3.94                                  3.89                         0.811 
3.88                                  3.87                         0.970 
3.56                                  3.82                         0.279 
N= are number of response on each type of cooperatives 
1 Score measured in 1-5 rating scale. 1 indicates the “Very Unsuccessful” and 5 indicates “Very 
Successful”  
 
Table 6-10: Results of Mean Score Comparisons of Effectiveness Pricing and Payment Practices 
















Maintaining member’s commitment 
Providing higher returns to the member 
Meeting the competitor’s prices for 
commodities 
Maintaining the desired volume of 
commodities 
Attracting the required quality of raw 
product 
4.00            3.85               0.437           3.86          3.95          0.659 
3.66            3.77              0.694            3.71          3.85          0.507 
4.05            3.85              0.329            3.91          3.85          0.733 
 
4.21            3.77              0.019**        3.85          3.95          0.670 
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Table 6-11: Rotated
1 Factor Loading Matrix and Communality From Common Factor Analysis 
(N=82). 
Factor
2  Variables 
1 2 3 4 
Communality 
Reducing member’s uncertainty of return 
Maintaining target rate of return 
Co-operative’s risk of operating deficit 
Matching Rival’s Pricing and payment 
policy 
Presence of competitor in output market 
Member’s cash flow management 
Encouraging member to deliver in co-op 
Managing co-operative’s working capital 



















































1 Varimax rotation method. 
2 Factor extraction method: Principal component. 
 
Table 6-12: Rotated
1 Factor Loading Matrix and Communality From Common Factor Analysis: 
Open Member Co-operatives (N=61) 
Factor
2  Variables 
1 2 3 
Communality 
Maintaining target rate of return 
Reducing member’s uncertainty of return 
Co-operative’s risk of operating deficit 
Encouraging member to deliver in co-op 
Matching rivals’ pricing and payment policy  
Managing co-operative’s working capital 
Members’ cash flow needs 
Equal treatment of members 





































1 Varimax rotation method. 
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Table 6-13: Rotated
1 Factor Loading Matrix and Communality from Common Factor Analysis: 
Closed Member Co-operatives (N=21) 
Factor
2  Variables 
1 2 3 
Communality 
Matching rivals’ pricing and payment policy 
Presence of competitor in output market  
Managing co-operative’s working capital 
Maintaining target rate of return 
Members’ cash flow needs 
Co-operative’s risk of operating deficit 
Equal treatment of members 
Encouraging member to deliver in co-op 





































1 Varimax rotation method. 
2 Factor extraction method: Principal component. 
 
Table 6-14: Rotated
1 Factor Loading Matrix and Communality From Common Factor Analysis: 
Unlimited quantity delivery (N=65) 
Factor
2  Variables 
1 2 3 4 
Communality 
Reducing member’s uncertainty of return 
Maintaining target rate of return 
Co-operative’s risk of operating deficit 
Matching Rival’s Pricing and payment 
policy 
Encouraging member to deliver in co-op 
Member’s cash flow management 
Equal treatment of members 
Presence of competitor in output market 



















































1 Varimax rotation method. 
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Table 6-15: Rotated
1 Factor Loading Matrix and Communality From Common Factor Analysis: 
Fixed quantity delivery (N=17) 
 
Factor
2  Variables 
1 2 3 4 
Communality 
Presence of competitor in output market 
Managing co-operative’s working capital 
Matching Rival’s Pricing and payment 
policy 
Maintaining target rate of return 
Equal treatment of members 
Co-operative’s risk of operating deficit 
Encouraging member to deliver in co-op 
Reducing member’s uncertainty of return 



















































1 Varimax rotation method. 




1 Factor Loading Matrix and Communality From Common Factor Analysis: 
Transferable Equity Stocks (N=26) 
 
Factor
2  Variables 
1 2 3 
Communality 
Presence of competitor in output market 
Matching rivals’ pricing and payment policy 
Maintaining target rate of return 
Managing co-operative’s working capital 
Encouraging member to deliver in co-op 
Co-operative’s risk of operating deficit 
Reducing member’s uncertainty of return 
Members’ cash flow needs 





































1 Varimax rotation method. 
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 Table 6-17: Rotated
1 Factor Loading Matrix and Communality from Common Factor Analysis: 
Non-transferable Equity Stocks (N=56) 
Factor
2  Variables 
1  2 3 4 
Communality 
Reducing member’s uncertainty of return 
Maintaining target rate of return 
Co-operative’s risk of operating deficit 
Matching rivals’ pricing and payment 
policy 
Encouraging member to deliver in co-op 
Members’ cash flow needs 
Presence of competitor in output market 
Equal treatment of members 



















































1 Varimax rotation method. 
2 Factor extraction method: Principal component. 
 
Table 6-18: Definitions of Independent Variables and Their Codes in Multinomial Logit Model. 
Independent variable  Codes  Definitions 
Year of operations  YEOPR  Number of year of operations. 
Membership  MEMBR  If open MEMBR=1 
If closed MEMBR=0 
Transferability of equity stocks  TRNEQ  If transferable TRANEQ=1 
If not transferable TRANEQ=0 
Processing activities  PROCES  Variable indicating proportion of total 
commodity processed. 
Number of competitors in 
commodity markets 
COMNO  Variable indicating the number of rival firms.
Commodity delivery contract with 
member 
COMCON  If fixed quantity COMCON=1  
If unlimited quantity=0 
Price contract with buyer in 
output market 
PRICN  If price contract PRICON=1 
Otherwise=0 
Co-operatives risk-return variable  RSKRT  Factor scores summarized from common 
factor analyses  
Competitive measures  MKTEN  Factor scores summarized from common 
factor analyses 
Member incentive variable  MEMIN  Factor scores summarized from common 
factor analyses 
Capital management and co-op’s 
philosophy 
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Table 6-19: List of Independent Variables in Different Multinomial Logit Model. 
Non-ranked model  Ranked model  Variables 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Year of operation 
Membership policy 
Commodity delivery contract 
Transferability of equity stocks 
Proportions of commodity processed 
Number of competitors in commodity market 
Importance of risk-return of members & co-op. 
Importance of market environment 
Importance of member incentives 











































Table 6-20: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Multinomial Logit Model 1 (N=78) 
 
Spot cash price  Pooling  Fixed forward  Variables 
Coefficients T-Ratios Coefficients T-Ratios Coefficients T-Ratios 
Years of operation  -0.00805  -0.551  0.02178  1.398  0.00304  0.208 
Membership policy  0.3473  0.275  -2.626**  -2.002  -1.013  -0.820 
Commodity  delivery  contract  -4.056**  -2.384 -2.359  -1.613 -3.659**  -2.353 
Transferability of equity 
stocks 
1.448 0.977  0.853 0.623  2.460*  1.760 
Proportions of commodity 
processed 
-0.8180 -0.677  0.8056  0.748  0.05041 -0.40 
Number of competitors in 
commodity market 
0.4503*  1.840 0.4127  1.743 0.4001  1.701 
Log likelihood function  -86.071   
Restricted log likelihood function  -108.131   
Chi-square (d.f.=18)  28.87   
Log likelihood ratio tests  44.12   
R-square (%)  20.40   
* Statistically significant at 10% level of significance.     
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Table 6-21: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Multinomial Logit: Model 2 (N=78) 
Spot cash price  Pooling  Fixed forward  Variables 
Coefficients T-Ratios Coefficients T-Ratios  Coefficients T-Ratios 
Years of operation  0.00167  0.111  0.03741** 2.284  0.01985  1.274 
Membership  policy  1.922** 1.960  -1.7404 -1.482  -0.1829 -0.174 
Commodity  delivery  contract  -3.5413* -1.942  -1.1318  -0.784 -3.1251* -1.950 
Transferability of equity 
stocks 
1.856 1.069  1.292 0.846  3.129*  1.929 
Proportions of commodity 
processed 
-0.7905 -0.615  0.6020  0.507 -0.2384 -0.192 
Importance of risk-return of 
members and co-op. 
0.3132 0.689  0.3580 0.773  -0.1327  -0.303 
Market environment  0.8317*  1.664 0.8716** 1.978  0.4088  0.971 
Member  incentives  -0.6862 -1.472  0.0440  0.096 -0.4094 -0.949 
Management of working 
capital. 
-0.1332  -0.266  0.4493 0.887  0.1039 0.228 
Log likelihood function  -80.069   
Restricted log likelihood function  -108.131   
Chi-square (d.f.=27)  40.11   
Log likelihood ratio tests  56.124   
R-square (%)  25.37 %   
* Statistically significant at 10% level of significance.     
** Statistically significant at 5% level of significance     
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Table 6-22: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Ranked Logit: Model 3 (N=76) 
 
Spot cash price  Pooling  Fixed forward price  Guaranteed minimum 
price 
Variables 
Coefficients T-ratios  Coefficients T-ratios  Coefficients T-ratios Coefficients T-ratios 
Years  of  operation  -0.0149 -1.409  0.0116  0.781  -0.0084 -0.931  -0.0068 -0.640 
Membership  policy  5.512***  3.076 1.492  1.044 3.632***  3.757  1.213  1.259 
Commodity  delivery  contract  -1.576  -1.459  1.861 1.419  -1.952*  -1.678  1.899 1.538 
Transferability of equity stocks  1.196  1.474 0.0561  0.062 2.628** 2.87 0.186  0.204 
Proportions of commodity 
processed 
-1.665* -1.684  1.711*  1.648  -1.318  -1.497  0.487  0.565 
Number of competitors in 
commodity market 
-0.3165  -1.307 -0.5357**  -2.398 -0.166  -0.965  -0.285*  -1.848 
 Log likelihood function: -91.816 
Restricted log likelihood function:  -122.317 
Chi-square (d.f.=24) : 36.41 
Log likelihood ratio tests : 61.002   
R-square (%) : 24.93   
* Statistically significant at 10% level of significance   
** Statistically significant at 5% level of significance   
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Table 6-23: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Ranked Logit: Model 4 (N=76) 
 
Spot cash price  Pooling  Fixed forward price  Guaranteed minimum 
price 
Variables 
Coefficients T-ratios  Coefficients T-ratios  Coefficients T-ratios Coefficients T-ratios 
Years of operation  -0.0224*  -1.74  0.0159  0.903  -0.0011  -0.97  -0.0084  -0.595 
Membership  policy  5.588*** 5.373  -2.967*  -1.95  2.838*** 3.215 -0.0242  -0.022 
Commodity delivery contract  -1.094  -0.933  1.339  1.050  -2.41*  -1.748  3.399**  2.45 
Transferability of equity stocks  -0.095*  -0.091 0.383  0.347  3.127*** 2.889 -1.169  -1.077 
Proportions of commodity 
processed 
-0.719 -0.661  2.763**  2.319  -1.389 -1.353  -0.494 -0.428 
Risk-return of members and co-op  1.107***  2.632 0.196  0.412 -0.257  -0.572 1.551***  2.730 
Market environment in 
commodity and output market 
-0.666 -1.302  1.962***  3.012  -0.834 -1.430  -0.425 -0.603 
Member  incentives  -1.117***  -2.577  0.635 1.196  -0.132  -0.349  0.455 1.118 
Management of working 
capital 
0.656 1.346  -0.634  -1.121  0.0133  .027  1.364**  2.288 
 Log likelihood function: -75.795 
Restricted log likelihood function:  -122.317 
Chi-square (d.f.=36) : 50.71 
Log likelihood ratio tests : 93.044 
R-square (%) : 38.03 
* Statistically significant at 10% level of significance 
** Statistically significant at 5% level of significance 
*** Statistically significant at 1% level of significance 
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Table 6-24: Profile of Representative Traditional Co-operatives. 
 
Independent  variables  Level for base case scenario 
for representative traditional 
co-operatives 
Change in level  
Membership policy 
Commodity delivery contract 
Transferable equity stocks 
Years of operation of co-operative 
Proportions of commodity processed 
Number of rival firms in commodity market 
Open (1) 












Figure in parenthesis is dummy variables. 
* Mean value of open co-operatives. 
 
Table 6-25: Predicted and Marginal Probability from MNL Model 1: Base Case Profile 
(Traditional Co-operatives). 
 






Base case scenario  0.5182  0.1972  0.2351  0.0493 
Changes to the predicted probability when one of independent variables is changed in the base 
scenario, ceteris paribus, where: 
Years of operation increased by one 









Membership is changed from open to 









Shifts the policy of accepting any 




















Proportions of commodity sold in 
processed form is increased by 1% 









Number of rival firms in commodity 
market is increased to 7 from the 
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Table 6-26: Profile of Representative New Generation Co-operatives. 
 
Independent  variables  Level for base case 
scenario for representative 
NGCs co-operatives 
Change in level  
Membership policy 
Commodity delivery contract 
Transferable equity stocks 
Years of operation of co-operative 
Proportions of commodity processed 
Number of rival firms in commodity market 
Closed (1) 












Figure in parenthesis is dummy variables. 
* Mean value of closed member co-operatives. 
 
Table 6-27: Predicted and Marginal Probability from Multinomial Logit Model 1: Base Case 
NGCs Profile. 
 






Base case scenario  0.04304 0.6022  0.2760 0.0786 
Changes to the predicted probability when one of independent variables is changed in the base 
scenario, ceteris paribus, where: 
Years of operation increased by one 









Membership is changed from closed 









Shifts to the policy of accepting fixed 









Co-operative shifts transferable equity 









Proportions of commodity sold in 
processed form is increased by 1% 









Number of rival firms in commodity 
market is increased to 7 from the base 
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Table 6-28: Level of Explanatory Variables for Traditional and New Generation Co-operatives. 
 
Independent variables  Level  for  traditional 
marketing co-
operatives 




Commodity delivery contract 
Transferable equity stocks 
Years of operation of co-operative 
Proportions of commodity processed 
Number of rival firms in commodity market 
Open (1) 















Numbers in parenthesis are dummy variables. 
* Mean value of total sample. 
 
Table 6-29: Effect of Change in Type of Co-operative Structure on Choice Probability of 
Different Pricing and Payment Alternatives: Model 1 
 
Predicted probability  Pricing and payment 
practices  Traditional co-op 
(Open member, unlimited 
quantity, non-transferable 
equity and no processing) 
New Generation co-op 
(Closed membership, 
fixed quantity, 
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Table 6-30: Effect of Increased Competition on Choice Probability of Different Pricing and 
Payment Alternatives (Model 1). 
 
Predicted probability for 
traditional co-operatives  









No. of rival 
firms = 7 
Change in 
Probability 
No. of rival 
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CHAPTER 7.0: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. 
 
7.1  Summary and Conclusion 
 
This study examined the co-operative’s choice of a particular pricing and payment 
contract for commodities supplied by member producers. This study also examined a 
number of demographic variables associated with the co-operatives’ choice of pricing 
and payment practices. These included membership policy, commodity delivery contract, 
transferability of equity stocks, years of operation, and market environment in which co-
operatives are operating. It is the intent of this chapter to summarize the most important 
issues and conclusion from the analysis, to provide recommendation to groups planning 
to form NGCs and to provide recommendations for future research.  
A mail questionnaire survey was used to elicit information on co-operative’s 
choice of pricing and payment contracts for commodities supplied by members. 
Questions were designed to elicit general information on demographic features of co-
operatives, level of competition and sources of capital. Information on co-operatives’ 
perceptions of the importance of various factors on their choice of pricing and payment 
options, and effectiveness of co-operatives’ pricing and payment policies in achieving 
various goals were elicited using a 1-5 rating scale. Four different approaches were used 
to examine a co-operative’s choice for a particular pricing and payment contract: mean 
score comparisons, factor analyses, multi-nominal logit models and ranked logit models.  
Percentage distribution of demographic characteristics of co-operatives, sources 
of capital acquisition, market environment in commodity and output market, commodity 
purchasing and output selling contract, and differential price payment are presented and 
discussed in Chapter 5. Based upon the percentage distribution, co-operatives with the 
characteristics of NGCs are practicing the “pooling” alternatives, where as co-operatives 
with characteristics of traditional marketing co-operatives are practicing the “spot market 
cash price” as the most common pricing and payment alternatives.  
Based upon the results of mean score comparison, co-operatives with 
characteristics of traditional marketing co-operative generally give more importance to 
encouraging members to deliver commodities into co-operatives and matching the 
competitor’s pricing and payment practices. On the other hand, co-operatives with 
characteristics of NGCs give more importance to reducing operating deficit of co-
operatives, reducing members uncertainty of return, and treating all members equally. 
The results of common factor analysis show that co-operatives’ choice of pricing 
and payment practices can be explained by four factors. These factors are: risk and return 
perceptions of co-operatives and members, market environment in commodity and output 
market, member incentives and management of working capital. Although results of 
factor analyses does not explicitly support the hypotheses developed in Chapter 1. Logit 
analysis of models 2 and 4 showed that market environment, member incentives and risk-
return factor have significant impact choice of pricing and payment practices by co-
operatives. 
Based upon the estimated marginal effects of explanatory variables on choice 
probability, it appears that “pooling” is the most common pricing and payment alternative 
for NGCs. On the other hand “spot market cash price” is the most common alternative for 
the traditional marketing co-operatives. When the number of firms in a co-operatives’   81
commodity market increases then co-operatives are more likely to choose the “spot 
market cash price”. 
  Besides the analysis of marginal probability of individual demographic variables, 
predicted probabilities for traditional marketing co-operatives and NGCs were compared. 
NGCs are more likely to choose “pooling” alternatives, whereas traditional marketing co-
operatives are more likely to choose the “spot market cash price”. 
Predicted probabilities were also estimated for two different co-operative 
organizations, when the degree of competition in the commodity market increases. With 
the entry of one additional firm into the co-operatives’ commodity market, the predicted 
probability of choosing the spot market cash price increases the most for traditional 
marketing co-operatives. On the other hand, the predicted probability of pooling 
alternatives increases the most for NGCs. 
From the estimated marginal probabilities we could not reject all three hypotheses 
developed in Chapter 1. The first hypothesis is that NGCs choose pooling as their main 
pricing and payment practice. The second hypothesis is traditional marketing co-
operatives choose spot market cash price. The third hypothesis is that traditional 
marketing co-operatives are more responsive to the competitive level in their commodity 
market than NGCs. Results are also consistent with theoretical predictions analyzed in 
Chapter 3.  
NGCs are more concerned about avoiding co-operative’s risk of operating deficits 
and are not concerned about the competitive level in their commodity market. As NGCs 
are engaged in value-added processing ventures, final returns of a co-operative will be 
realized only after disposal of the final goods. There is price risk in the co-operatives’ 
output market. By restricting membership and putting restrictions on the amount of 
commodity a member can deliver, NGCs might have arranged the required quantity of 
commodities for their processing and marketing facilities. Therefore, NGCs do not need 
to match the rival firm’s pricing and payment offer to attract the raw materials. In such a 
case, NGCs are more likely to be concerned with reducing the co-operatives’ risk of an 
operating deficit. The pooling method, which eliminates the co-operative’s risk of an 
operating deficit, could be an attractive alternative. Results of probability analysis shows 
that NGCs are more likely to choose a pooling option. However, the pooling method 
increases the member’s uncertainty of return. Members might have joined NGCs to 
capture greater benefit. With closed membership and control of commodity supply, 
NGCs are likely to pass this greater benefit on to their members. NGCs are closed 
membership co-operatives with the restrictions on commodity supply. The pooling 
practice of NGCs is consistent with the marginal value product (MVP) pricing or 
maximum net price objective discussed in Chapter 3. While maximum net price 
objectives are unlikely to be achieved in the short-run, the pooling practice of NGCs is 
most likely to be consistent with the MVP pricing rule. With MVP pricing rule NGCs can 
finance the growth opportunities through retained member earning and avoid the free 
rider problem by non-members. However, the NGCs requires control over the quantity 
delivered by members. 
Traditional marketing co-operatives address members’ cash flow needs and 
uncertainty of return. They are also more responsive to changes in the competitive level 
in the commodity market. With the open membership policy in traditional co-operatives, 
members are not obliged to deliver commodities to their co-operatives. In order to   82
acquire sufficient volume of commodities, traditional co-operatives might have to match 
the rival firm’s pricing and payment offer. By paying the spot market cash price at the 
time of commodity delivery, co-operatives can acquire the needed volume of 
commodities and pass on the immediate benefit to members. With the spot market cash 
price members get the price of their commodities at the commodity delivery time. 
Member’s uncertainty of return is eliminated. The results from the probability analyses 
show that traditional co-operatives are more likely to offer the spot market cash price. 
This result is consistent with the average net revenue (ANR) pricing rule discussed in 
Chapter 3. With open membership policy and accepting any eligible quantity of 
commodities, any pricing rule in co-operatives results in ANR pricing rule. Through an 
ANR pricing rule members get immediate benefit, which may act as incentive for 
members to patronize their co-operatives. However, minimal profits are made and co-
operatives may not be able to finance growth opportunities through members’ retained 
earnings. Indeed survey respondents reported debt as the main source of new capital in 
traditional co-operatives (Chapter 5). 
 
7.2  Implications for Co-operatives 
 
  The information about sources of capital presented in section 5.6 of Chapter 5.0, 
could have significance for those thinking about formation of NGCs and marketing co-
operatives. The majority of co-operatives rely on external “debt” followed by “retained 
earnings”. Excessive reliance on debt could be risky for co-operatives when the net 
income of co-operative and interest rates both fluctuate severely (Cobia et al. 1989). 
Cobia et al. (1989) also cited the findings of Royer that co-operatives appear more 
heavily leveraged than do IOFs in the same industries. Co-operatives also have to outlay 
greater proportions of income for debt servicing. Existing or new co-operatives should 
focus on acquiring capital from internal sources, such as: issuing new shares, membership 
fees from existing and new members or issuing preferred
1 shares to the public.  
7.2.1  Implications for New Generation Co-operatives 
 
From the probability analyses it is found that pooling is the most common pricing 
and payment contract among the NGCs. By offering pooling options, NGCs effectively 
minimize the co-operative’s risk of operating deficits from output price risks. However, 
pooling exposed members to risk of uncertain returns. In NGCs, equity shares allocate 
the right to deliver a certain quantity of commodity to the co-operative. These delivery 
rights represent a “dual contract”- the farmer must deliver a unit of commodity for each 
share purchased and the co-operative must accept and compensate the farmer for each 
unit delivered. If farmers fail to supply the amount contracted, farmers must purchase it 
elsewhere or have the co-op purchase it on their behalf. Farmers may fail to deliver the 
contracted volume either due to lower farm production or higher cash price offered by 
other firms in the market, which reduces the co-operative’s throughput (Zeuli 1999).  
Commodity delivery contracts for longer periods, heavy punishment in case of 
contract default, assurance of higher return from processed products and education of 
                                                      
1 Preferred stocks seldom has voting rights. Preferred stock holders have priority over common stock 
holders if a co-operative is liquidated (Cobia 1989).   83
members about pooling process could maintain the member’s commitment to new 
generation co-operatives. Assurance of higher returns from final products may discourage 
members from taking short-term benefits by acting opportunistically. Memberships size 
and size of marketing pool are closed in NGCs. Members may have joined the NGCs 
with the expectation of higher returns. An NGC can assures higher return to members if it 
starts business with careful analysis of market conditions or where there are scarce 
investor-owned firms involvement. Most of NGCs in the USA are operating in niche 
markets such as pasta production, sugar beet processing, ethanol plant, specialty cheese, 
bison meat etc.  
7.2.2  Implications for Traditional Marketing Co-operatives 
 
By paying spot market cash price, a traditional co-operative reduces the price risk 
of members or producers, but increases co-operative’s risk of operating deficits. Paying 
the spot market cash price also puts pressure on co-operatives’ working capital. In such 
cases traditional marketing co-operatives may have to seek outside debt capital. This 
increases the financial risks for the co-operatives. Due to open membership policy and no 
obligation on the part of members to deliver their commodities, pooling may not be an 
appropriate pricing and payment contract especially if there are a number of other firms 
in the commodity market. Traditional marketing co-operatives should hedge the price of 
their output in futures market or negotiate contracts with buyers of co-operative’s output 
to minimize the risk of having operating deficits. Traditional co-operatives may choose 
such pricing and payment alternatives which demand less working capital and at the same 
time reduces the member’s risk of uncertain returns.  
Fixed forward price contract and guaranteed minimum price contract could be 
attractive alternatives for traditional marketing co-operatives. A fixed forward price and 
guaranteed minimum price contract reduces the member’s uncertainty of return.  
 
7.3  Limitations and Implications for Future Research 
 
This study does not address the pricing method of supply managed commodities. 
Some of the surveyed co-operatives are doing business in supply managed commodities 
such as dairy products. These co-operatives commented that the questionnaire used in 
this survey is inadequate to capture the information on pricing and payment practices on 
supply managed commodities. Throughout the volume of this study, it is claimed and 
discussed that by choosing pooling alternatives NGCs effectively reduce their risk of 
operating deficits while members are exposed to risk of uncertain returns. Some co-
operatives who practice pooling alternatives commented that they make advance payment 
of a certain portion of the value of the commodities at the time of commodity delivery. 
Advance payment may solve the members’ immediate cash flow needs and to some 
extent may reduce the uncertainty of return. This study does not address the impact of 
advance payment on member’s commitment to co-operatives using pooling practices. 
Similarly, most traditional co-operatives are doing business on multiple 
commodities and some are often supplying farm inputs to members. There is a strong 
possibility that income loss on one business may be compensated from other businesses.    84
Despite the losses, co-operatives may continue to do business in order to stay in the 
market. This study could not address the impact of possible revenue transfer between 
business enterprises within the co-operative on choices of pricing and payment practices. 
  Equity capital contribution from members generally constitutes a significant 
proportion of capital structure of NGCs. This study only studied the perception of 
managers of co-operative, and linked these perceptions to demographic variables of 
different co-operative organizations. A fruitful area of study would be to survey members 
of NGCs as well as traditional co-operatives about how satisfied they are with the pricing 
and payment practices of their co-operatives. If the researcher knows the members’ 
reasons for joining traditional marketing co-operatives and NGCs along with their socio-
demographic characteristics, the researcher could analyze the differences in members’ 
preferences and circumstances. With information on these differences in members’ 
perceptions, pricing and payment practices of their co-operatives could be further 
analyzed. With this information researchers could make better recommendations for co-
operatives about their pricing and payment practices.  
  The other important limitation of this study is estimation of impact of the 
competition on the choice probability of pricing and payment practices. Responses on the 
number of competitors in the co-operative’s commodity market were the respondent’s 
(manager’s) perceptions and it may not be an explicit number. If researchers could use 
secondary sources of quantitative data, the estimated result would be more reliable. 
Furthermore, an increased number of firms does not necessarily imply increased 
competition. There might be tacit collusion and alliance among the firms, which allows 
firms to behave in a monopsonistic way. Alternatively, a few firms competing on price 
can be very competitive despite the limited number of competing firms. This study does 
not consider possible collusion or alliances among the firms. 
It is often claimed that NGCs are doing business in niche markets, which implies 
that there may be fewer rival firms in NGC’s markets. Efforts were made to find the 
competitive level in co-operatives output and commodity markets by analyzing the 
concentration ratios. Data on concentration ratios of manufacturing industries for the 
U.S.A. were available, but the concentration ratios on raw commodity were not available. 
Efforts were made to relate the establishment of NGCs and the type of output they 
produced, but the grouping of products in four-digit standard industrial classifications 
(SIC) were too broad to include the specific type of output of new generation co-
operatives, such as ethanol, bison meat, specialty cheese, pasta etc. Furthermore, due to 
the regional nature of agricultural markets, predicting the competitive level in co-
operative’s output market based on national data on concentration ratios would be 
inadequate.  
Management’s ability to handle and operate different pricing and payment 
alternatives, and member’s ability to adapt with these operation may influence the co-
operative’s choice of pricing and payment practices. Education about operation and 
management of different alternatives to members and management could play an 
important role in the success of these pricing and payment alternatives. This study does 
not consider any of these aspects. Therefore, future research on choice of pricing and 
payment practices should include the education of members and co-operative’s 
management about different pricing and payment practices. 
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Appendix A: Number of Respondent Answering Each Question. 
 
Variables Number  of 
Responses 
Year of operations of co-operatives  84 
Member size  81 
Membership 84 
Reasons for open membership  84 
Reasons for closed membership  84 
Non-member business  84 
 Equity revolving plan  83 
Transferability of equity stocks  83 
Voting mechanisms  84 
Sources of capital  84 
Commodity delivery contract  84 
Commodity market structure  80 
Output selling contract with buyer  80 
Output market structure  77 
Type of output buyer  80 
Differential price  84 
Proportions of commodity sold in processed form  84 
Importance of various factors on co-operatives’ choice of pricing and payment 
alternatives 
83 
Effectiveness of co-operatives’ pricing and payment policies in achieving 
various objectives. 
83 
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Appendix B: Ranking of Pricing and Payment Practices by Co-operatives. 
Figure B-1: Ranking
2 of Pricing and Payment Practices by Co-operatives of the U.S.A. 
Figure B-2: Ranking of Pricing and Payment Practices by Canadian Co-operatives. 
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Figure B-3: Ranking of Pricing and Payment Practices by Open Member Co-operatives. 
 






                                                                                                                                                              
2 Rank “1” indicates the alternative is the most commonly practiced and “6” indicates that alternative is 
least commonly practiced. 
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Figure B-7: Ranking of Pricing and Payment Practices by Co-operative with Transferable Equity 
Stocks. 
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Variables  Spot cash price  Pooling  Fixed forward price  Guaranteed 
minimum price 
Others 
Base Case Scenario  0.5507  0.0312 0.3366  0.0253  0.056 
Changes to the predicted probability when one of independent variables is changed in the base case scenario, ceteris paribus, where: 
 
































































Numbers in parenthesis are the marginal probability. 
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Appendix D: Effect of Change in Type of Co-operative Structure on Choice Probability 
of Different Pricing and Payment Alternatives: Model 3 
 
Predicted probability  Pricing and payment 
practices  Traditional co-op 
(Open member, unlimited 
quantity, non-transferable 
equity and no processing) 
New Generation co-op 
(Closed membership, 
fixed quantity, 
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Appendix E: Questionnaire on Pricing and Payment Policies of Agricultural marketing 





The University of Alberta is conducting a survey of agricultural marketing and new generation 
co-operatives. Information from this survey will be used to evaluate factors that influence the 
commodity pricing and payment policies of marketing and new generation co-operatives. Pricing 
and payment practices have an impact on the co-operatives’ ability to meet members’ needs and 
the cooperatives’ business objectives. 
 
It will take about 20 minutes to complete the enclosed questionnaire. Please return it in the 
stamped reply envelope. Participation is voluntary. Answers from this questionnaire will be 
compiled with others. All individual information obtained from this survey is confidential and 
will only be viewed by the two persons undersigned below. If you are interested in receiving a 
report of the results of this research, please enclose a “Business Card” of your co-operatives with 
this questionnaire. 
 
This questionnaire has two sections: The first section contains questions about features of your 
co-operative, the marketing environment you deal with and pricing and payment practices of your 
co-operative. The second section contains questions relating to factors that affect the co-
operative’s choice of pricing and payment policies. 
 
This research project is being carried out by “The Cooperative Chair in Agricultural Marketing” 
at the University of Alberta, and is funded by the Alberta Agricultural Research Institute (AARI). 
For more information about this survey, please contact the undersigned. 
 
Your participation will be greatly appreciated. 
 
 
James R. Unterschultz, Assistant Professor    Rajendra Gurung, Graduate Student 
Department of Rural Economy        Department of Rural Economy, 
University of Alberta, Edmonton      University of Alberta, Edmonton 
T6G  2H1,  Canada      T6G  2H1,  Canada 
Tel:  (780)  492-5439      Tel:  (780)  492-4225 
Fax:  (780)  492-0268      Tel:  (780)  492-0268 
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Section I: Features of the cooperative and marketing environment: 
 
 








3)  Is membership open (i.e. can any qualified producer enter and exit at any time)? 
Please “√” the appropriate one. 
 
______ YES. (If Yes, Go To Question 4) 
______NO. ( If No, Go To Question 5). 
 
 
4)  If YES, what are the reasons for open membership? (Please “√” all that apply to your 
cooperative). 
 
____More members and a greater product volume allow the cooperative to operate more 
efficiently. 
____More members and a greater product volume give the co-op more bargaining power. 
____Open membership is the cooperative’s policy. 
____Other (Please list and explain briefly): ___________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
(Please Go To Question 6) 
 
 
5)  If NO, what are the reasons for closed membership? (Please“√” all that apply to your 
cooperative). 
 
______Physical plant facilities are currently at efficient capacity.  
______To match the capacity of the cooperative’s marketing and handling facilities.  
______To control the commodity quality. 
______Other (Please list and explain ): ________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________   97
6)  Does your cooperative purchase commodities from non-member producers? (Please 
“√” the appropriate one.) 
 








7)  In your cooperative, can a member sell their equity share to other members or other 
qualified persons? (Please “√” one). 
 
______YES. (If Yes, Go To Question No. 8)  
______NO. ( If No, Go To Question. No. 9) 
 
 











______ YES. Please briefly explain how it works: _______________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
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10) How does your co-op acquire additional capital for operations or expansion of the 
business? Please rank the following capital sources, from most important to least 
important. [One (1) is for the most important and NA (Not Applicable) for 
alternatives that are not relevant to your cooperative].. 
 
____ Annual membership fees. 
____ Required equity stock purchases for existing members. 
____ Initial entry fees for new members. 
____ Retained patronage funds 
____  Debt from financial institutions. 
____ Other ( Please list and rank ):____________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
11) How is member voting conducted in your cooperative? (Please “√ ” the appropriate 
answer). 
 
____ One member one vote. 
____ In proportion to the member’s patronage. 
____ In proportion to equity capital invested by the member. 
____ Others (Please explain): _______________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
12)  Based upon business volume, please rank the four most important commodities your 
cooperative purchases from members. (Using the scale from 1 to 4, 1 for most 
important and 4 for least important).  
 





13) How does your cooperative accept the delivery of raw commodities from members? 
(Please“√ ”the appropriate answer). 
 
_____ In fixed quantity from each member ( set in delivery contract). 
 
_____ Any quantity delivered by a members. 
 
_____ Others ( Please explain):______________________________________________ 
   99
14) How many other firms in your region, or market, purchase a significant volume of the 
commodity ranked number one (1) in question number 12 ? Please check one. 
 
______  None       _____ Three      _____ Six or more 
______    One     _____  Four 
______    Two     _____  Five 
 
15) Approximately what percentage of the cooperative’s raw commodity ranked number 
one (1) in question number 12 is sold or marketed: 
 
_____ %  With no processing 
_____ %  With minimal processing (such as cleaning) 
_____ %  In processed form 
_____ %  Other, (Please list ):_________________________________________ 
Total= 100% 
 
16) Please rank the four most important products (either in processed or unprocessed 
form derived from commodities purchased from members) your cooperative markets 
in terms of business volume? (Using the scale from 1 to 4, 1 for the most important 
and 4 for the least important). 
 





17) How many other business firms in your region, or marketing area, market a 




____  None     _____  Three    _____  Six  or  more 
____  One     _____  Four 
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18) To what type of firms does your cooperative sell these products listed in question 16? 
(Please “√ ” all that apply to your cooperative). 
 
_____ Commodity brokers      ______ Processors 
_____  Wholesalers     ______  Directly  to  Final  consumers 
_____Retailers    ______  Other (Please list):______________ 
      ____________________________________ 
 
 
19) How does your cooperative arrange the sale of these final products (listed in question 
number 16) ? (Please “√ ” all that apply to your cooperative). 
 
____ Price Contract With Buyer 
____ Volume Contract With Buyer 
____ Price and Volume Contract With Buyer 
____ Open market transaction 




20)  Rank the most common payment or contracting alternatives used by your cooperative 
for the commodities delivered by members? (Using the scale of 1,2,3 …., 1 as the 
most common, 2 is the second most common and so on.) 
 
_____ Spot market cash price at the time of delivery. 
_____  Pool price or average price over a certain period. 
_____ Fixed forward cash price contract. 
_____ Guaranteed minimum price or the floor price contract.  
_____ Basis Contract. 
_____ Hedge-to-arrive contract. 
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21) Does your cooperative pay transportation costs to members for delivery of a 
commodity? 
 








22) Does your cooperative pay quality premiums for commodities delivered by the 
member? 
 








23)  Does your cooperative differentiate between low volume and high volume 
member deliveries in terms of per unit price? 
 








24)  Does your cooperative offer incentives to encourage members to deliver at 
specific times of the year? 
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Section II:  Factors affecting pricing and payment practices. 
 
1) Using a scale of 1-5, please indicate how important each of the following factors are to 
the payment and pricing policy of your cooperative in purchasing commodities from 
members. 
 
Label of ordering is as follows: 
 
1-  Not important at all. 
2-  Less important 
3-  Neutral 
4-  Important 
5-  Very Important 
 
Example: 
How important is it to purchase a computer with a chip manufactured by Intel ? 
 
Not Important At All               Very Important 
  1    2    3    4                              5  
 
The choice is 4, which implies that the individual considers a computer with a chip 
manufactured by Intel as an important factor when purchasing the computer. 
 
 
i)  How important is matching the pricing and payment policy of rival firms when 
buying commodities from members? 
 
Not Important At All               Very Important 
  1    2    3    4                              5   
 
ii)  How important is managing the cooperative’s working capital when determining 
the pricing and payment policy of the cooperative? 
 
Not Important At All               Very Important 
  1    2    3    4                              5   
 
iii)  How important is the presence of major competitors in the cooperative’s output 
(derived from commodity purchased from members) market when determining the 
pricing and payment policy of the cooperative? 
 
Not Important At All               Very Important 
  1    2    3    4                              5   
 
iv)  How important is encouraging members to deliver to your co-operative in 
determining the pricing and payment policy? 
   103
Not Important At All               Very Important 
  1    2    3    4                              5   
 
v)  How important is it to consider member’s cash flow requirements when 
determining the pricing and payment policy? 
 
Not Important At All               Very Important 
  1    2    3    4                              5   
 
vi)  How important is it to reduce the cooperative’s risk of having an operating deficit 
when determining the pricing and payment policy of cooperative?  
 
Not Important At All               Very Important 
  1    2    3    4                              5   
 
vii)  How important is it to reduce member’s uncertainty of returns because of price 
fluctuations when determining the pricing and payment policy? 
 
Not Important At All               Very Important 
  1    2    3    4                              5   
 
viii)  How important is it for the cooperative to maintain a target rate of return when 
determining the pricing and payment policy? 
 
Not Important At All               Very Important 
  1    2    3    4                              5   
 
ix)  How important is it for the cooperative to treat members equally when 
determining the pricing and payment policy? 
 
Not Important At All               Very Important 
  1    2    3    4                              5   
 
 
The next set of questions are related to your perception of how successful the pricing and 
payment policy of your cooperative is in meeting the cooperative’s goals. 
 
 
2)  Using a scale of 1-5, indicate the level of success of the pricing and payment 
policy of your cooperative.  
 
Label of ordering is as follows: 
 
1-  Very Unsuccessful 
2-  Unsuccessful 
3-  Neutral   104
4-  Successful 
5-  Very Successful 
 
 
i)  How successful is the pricing and payment policy of your cooperative at 
maintaining the members’ commitment to the cooperative? 
 
Very  Unsuccessful       Very  Successful 
    1    2    3    4               5 
 
ii)  How successful is the pricing and payment policy of your cooperative at 
providing higher returns to the member? 
 
Very  Unsuccessful       Very  Successful 
    1    2    3    4               5 
 
iii)  How successful is the pricing and payment policy of your cooperative at meeting 
the competitor’s prices for commodities? 
 
Very  unsuccessful       Very  Successful 
    1    2    3    4               5 
 
iv)  How successful is the pricing and policy of your cooperative at maintaining the 
desired volume of commodity deliveries? 
 
Very  unsuccessful       Very  Successful 
    1    2    3    4               5 
 
v)  How successful is the policy of your cooperative at attracting the required quality 
of raw commodity? 
 
Very  unsuccessful       Very  Successful 
    1    2    3    4               5 
 
What is your role with this cooperative? 
 
_____ Member of Board of Directors 
_____ Employee 
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Briefly describe the cooperative’s pricing and payment policy for members and any 





























Thank you for taking the time to complete and return this questionnaire. 
Your contribution to this research effort is greatly appreciated. 
 
Jim Unterschultz 
Rajendra Gurung 